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II'l'RODUOTIOI 
IS THE SOIENTIFIO BEHAVIORIS'l' SCIENTIFIO? 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the claim 
of Behaviorism. Ills Scientific Behaviorism Seientific?· or, a. 
the Behaviorist claims, more scientific than any other psycho-
logy: 
As the Behaviorist has redefined many of the traditionaJ 
terms, such as ·Seience, Postulate, and Movement,· considerable 
space has been devoted to a d,iscuss ion of these fundamental no-
tions, for it is precisely here that there seems to be a radical 
parting of the ways. 
It will be evident from this discussion that BehaviorisD 
is a Monistic, Materialistic, and Mechanistic Science. Accord-
ing to it, Man is a physical, electroprotonic machine. Profes-
sor 18iss has been extensively quoted in this thesis, for he ap-
pears to be the most able and the most explicit defender of Be-
haviorism in the world of science. 
OHAPTER I 
FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS 
Behaviorism professes to be a scientific study of h~ 
man behavior. Scientific Behaviorism asks: "Can the facts of 
human behavior be studied scientificallY?" The professed Be-
haviorist dec lares: 
II Tradi tional psycho logy through introspection, 
and philosophy through speculation, have given 
the study of the individual a status which has 
practica.lly removed it from the domain of na-
tural sciences." I 
In order to understand well this objection of the BehaViorist, 
it will be necessary to investigate these fundamental notions. 
1. THE PROBLD 
The problem and subject proper of this thesis is form-
ulated. interrogatively: "Is scientific behaviorism scientific?" 
Before we can answer, it will be necessary to define what the 
psychologist and scientist and behaviorist understand by the 
terms Science, Natural Science, Psychology, Traditional Psycho-
logy, and Behaviorism. 
SOIENOI. In the broadest sense, science or general 
science is nothing more than accurate knowledge. Kore strictI 
science is general or it is not; lf general, it is philosophy, 
if it ls not, lt is special science. Special sclence llkewlse 
may be distinguished: it ls elther speculative or it is not; 
lf speculative, it dealS chiefly with sane theorles and pure 
knowledge, but if practical, chiefly wlth the applicatlon of 
those theorles to lndlvldual beings or beings in the conorete. 
Theoretioal science deals with abstract knowledge, practical 
with concrete knowledge. 
NATURAL SCIENCE. Slnce scienoe is accurate knowledge, 
na,tural science is accurate knowledge of nature. Aocording to 
Whetham: "Natural science is ordered knowledge of natural phe-
nomena and of the relations between them.·2 Such knowledge is 
evidently theoretical or speculative. But speculative science 
may be either mental or it may not: if it is mental l it is ei-
ther metaphysics or mathematics, and this type does not deal 
with the individual primarily; if it is not purely mental, it 
ls called natural science, for lt has for its object of study, 
na ture or natura 1 beings as such. 
When the term 'Sclenoe" ls used today it generally re-
fers to sclence in the strlotest sense, namely, natural sclence, 
or as some sclentists S8.y, science proper. Besides being COD-
trasted with mental scienoe, natural science is opposed today to 
"non-science" or "unnatural scienoe" by progressive ·scientists" 
who do not recognize anythlng above matter, that is, anything 
immaterial or spiritual. These scientlsts, who call themselves 
Materialistic Monists, employ the terms SCienoe, Natural Science 
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or Physical Science synonymously with Science of sensible enti-
ties. To them all science. worthy of the nS.me is Material Sci-
ence. This is Science in the strictest sense, todayts extra-
scholastic science in the common acceptance of that ter~ 
Because the Behaviorist professes to be a Materialistic 
Monist, he is opposed by scientists who recognize in human na-
ture two elements, body and vital principle or soul. These 
soientists use the terms Science, Physical Science, or Natural 
Soienoe in a wider sense, to include the whole of human nature, 
its spiritual component as well as its material oomponent. 
They maintain, that if natural soience of the human individual 
is to be adequately conceived and worthy of the name, it must 
inc l.u.de his who Ie nature, not merely his material component or 
body. In our investigation, therefore, we must and shall here-
after use such terms in the wider sense, as understood by these 
Dualists. 
PSYCHOLOGIES. Traditional psyohologyhas defined Psy-
oho logy as the study of the soul, and therefore proceeded to 
study the soul, and this by the most convenient and effective 
method, introspection. But such a psyoho1ogy waS aocused of 
being too subjeotive, too introspective. It oannot be denied 
that Titohenerism was a "reductio ad absurd.WI" of the intro-
spective method. Watson, the rather of Behaviorism, rightly 
protested, and rendered experimental psyoh01ogy invaluable ser-
vice in redirecting psychological investigation by insisting 
upon beginning with the concrete objeot, a.nd making all results 
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congruent with objective evidence derived from the physical ob-
ject under investigation. Aocording to Watson, 
"Behavioristic psychology is a purely 
objeotive branoh of natural soienoe. Its 
theoretioal goal is the prediction and 
control of behavior. Introspection forms 
no essential part of its methods, nor is 
the soientific value of the data dependent 
upon the readiness with which they lend 
themselves to interpretation in terms of 
oonsciousness ••• Psychology is the science 
of behavior. "3 
Subsequent 1y to Wa,tson, the Behaviorists became acoustomed to 
designate all psychologies before 1914, the year of foundation 
of the Behavioristic School, as Traditional. 
In this thesis, we shall restrict the term Traditional 
Psychology to those Schools that define Psychology as "the 
science of the individual human being," whether that being be, 
according to Kiss Calkins, our se 1f, or another se l:f, another 
human being besides ourselves. Other definitions of Psychology 
as "the study of conscious life or conscious processes" are 
discarded by the Behaviorist as entirely unnecessary. Never-
theless, for many modern psychologists Experimental Psychology 
remains still a scienoe of immediate experience (erfahrungs-
wissenschaft), or a science of feelings and perceptions studied 
by direct or introspective methods. With James, the Dualist 
may 8ay: 
npsychology is a natural SCience, that 
is, the mind which the psychologist studies 
is the mind of di8tinct individuals inhabit-
ing definite pDrtion8 of a. real 8pace and of 
a real time ••• To the psychologist, then, 
the minds he studies are •. objects, in a 
world of other objects. U'" 
2. THE OPPONENTS 
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According to Daal1stic Psychology, the "subject matter 
of psychology or the object with which it is directly concerned 
is ~ conscious life, .. 5 
BEHAVIORISK, What is Psychology from the standpoint of 
a Behaviorist? Let us hear Watson, who justly objected against 
the unrealism of some of his contemporaries, and courageOusly 
reso Ived to restore the human being back to reality and to 
natural science: 
"Throughout the preparation of this ele-
mentary text I have tried to write with 
the human anima 1 in front of me. I have 
put down on 11 thoSe things that any pro-
perlr trained individual can observe •••• 
it does not take a psychologist qua psy-
chologist to study human activity, but it 
does take a trained scientist and one 
trained along special lines •••• Until psy-
chology recognizes this and discards ev-
erything which oannot be stated in the 
terms of universal terms of SCience, she 
does not deserve her p lacein the sun. 
Behavior psychology does make this at-
tempt for the first time ••••• lt teaohes 
us to face the human being as he is and 
to dea.l frank lr with him, •• :-U;- -
The Behaviorist is determined to be scientific, the 
Dualist also, the Psycho logist and Scientist have the same in-
tention. What must a Scientist do to be scientific? What oon-
ditions must he oomply with in order to be strictly and rigidl 
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scientific? A scientist must: 
1. Study the human being as he i8 -an object in realit, 
by the process of Exact Observation. 
2. Olassify the Facts of Observation. 
3. Formulate a methodical order of procedure, or in 
other words, formulate a Working HypotheSiS. 
4. Verify this preconceived hypothesis by pertinent, 
well-selected, methodical Experimentation. 
5. Infer and formulate from experimental data, the 
correct and precise Conc lpion. 
6. State the result of investigation in universal 
terms of Soience, whioh statement is a Scientific Law. 
7. Arrange all in a logioally oonstructed System; the 
resu It is Soienoe. 
8. Desoribe his experimental methods in detail so that 
they oan be verified under similar oonditions by another sci-
entist; for although it is possible "From one, learn all,- yet 
in order to be rigorously sOientifio, we need at least two to 
agree to establish a new sOience, or a newly-disoovered soien-
tifio law. 
THE STAIDPOIIlT OF THE BEHAVIORIST. Watson is explioi t: 
"The present volume does some violence to 
the traditional classification of psycholog-
ical topios and to their oonventional treat-
ment. For example, the reader will find no 
discussion of conSCiousness, and no reference 
to such terms as sensation, perception, at-
tention, will, i-.ge and the 11ke. These 
,"," 
__ ----------------------------------------------------------1 
terms are in good repute, but I have found 
that I can get along without them both in 
carrying out investigations and in present-
ing psychology as a system to my students. 
I frankly do not know what they mean, nor 
do I be lieve that anyone e lBe can use them 
consistently. I have retained such terms 
as thinking and memory, but I have carefully 
re-def1ned them 1n coriformity with behavior-
istic psychology. It is po.sible to retain 
attention, to re-define 6t and make it serve • 
•••. 1 have not done so." 
Let it be well noted here that Watson does not deny the 
existence of consciousness, but he denies the serviceability of 
consciousness in scientific psych010gy or Behaviorism; in other 
wordS, Watson prescinds agnostically from consciousness. Such 
a position is perfectly licit for a sCientist, provided he re-
ma,ins faithful to his point of view, and does not deny the ex-
istence of a personal experience and fact, than which nothing 
is more certain. Does the Behaviorist make that illicit trans-
ition from prescision to denial? We shall see. 
Another contemporary psychologist, Albert Paul Weiss, 
Professor of Psychology at Ohio State UniverSity, is a fra,nk 
exponent and expositor of Behaviorism. He says: 
"With reference to the work of the two 
psychologists most frequent lJ identified 
with the behaviorist point of view, ¥ax F. 
Keyer and John B. Watson, I believe I am 
in complete agreement on essentials. "7 
In developing this thesis, the present writer will of-
ten consult Prof. Weiss, because his work is recent and well 
stated. He posits the issue between Behaviorism and all the 
other known psycho logies in no uncertain or ambiguous terms. 
~-------------------------------------------------------, 
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3. THE ISSUE. 
Aocording to Weiss, the issue or the 11ne of battle 
between Behaviorism and other Psychologies is clearly defined. 
"The issue, it seems to me, oan be 
formulated as, l!. is!. ooncept of mind 2.I. 
oonsoiousness ~ necessary concept !a ~ 
scientific investigs.tion of human behavior 
~ hums.n achievelllent?a! -
But according to the dualistio definition of Gruender, 
who defined Psychology as the study of conscious life, con-
sciousness would seem to include the whole sUbject matter of 
psychology. In other words, for the Dualist consciousness is 
indispensable in his Experimental Psychology, whereas for the 
Behaviorist consciousness is unnecessary or even a hindranoe. 
There is not the least shadow of doubt about these contradio-
tory pOSitions, of which one must most certainly be wrong. Is 
the position of the Behaviorist as expressed by Weiss correct? 
"Behaviorism claims to render a more 
complete and a more soientifio account or--
the totality of human achievement without 
the conception of consciousness than tra-
ditional psychology Is able to render with 
it."9 (Italics by Weiss.) 
William James agrees with Professor Gruender. In his 
first chapter entitled the "Scope of Psychology," he defines: 
"Psychology is the Science of Mental 
Life, both of its phenomena and of their 
conditions." IO 
And again, beginniDg his treatment of the methods of 
psychological investigation, he writes in italics: 
-"Introspecti?e Observation is what we 
have to rely on first and foremost and 
ar.ays •••• Everyone agrees that we there 
(in our minds) discover states of con-
sciousness •••• I regard this belief-ai 
the funda,mental of all the postulates 
of Psychology. "11 
BEHAVIORISM IS ANOTHER PSYCHOWGY WITHOUT A SOUL. 
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According to the Behaviorist quoted, Behaviorism oppose 
Traditional Psychology contra.dictorily. Precisely in what doe. 
this opposition consist? Weis. is crystal-Clear: 
"Much of what is written, both syste~ 
atic and experimental, is an attempt to 
give both a mentalistic and a behavior-
istic~ount."12 
Olearly, the Behaviorist distinguishes between mind 
and not-mind, between Behaviorism and Mentalism or Traditional 
Psychology, between a Psyoho1ogy whioh admits mental prooesses, 
oonsoiousness, introspection, and Behaviorism which ignores the 
for scientifio reasons. The Behaviorist firmly believes that 
further progress in psyohology is possible soientifica1ly only 
on the necessary condition that oonsciousness be deleted from 
the psychologist's point of view and vocabulary. ror that rea-
son he maintains a rigid, non-menta.l, ma,terialistio standpoint. 
As we have seen, James regards oonsciousness as "the 
fundaments,l of all the postulates of Psycho logy." Since James 
introduces postulates, sinoe no soience oan do without post~ 
ls,tes, since postu lates are not clearly understood nor olearly 
defined, and since the entire final third of Weiss' 452-page 
text-book is devoted to the POSTULATES OF BEHAVIORISM, it i8 
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absolutely essential to define olearly the role of postulates in 
all scienoes, and in particular in Psychology and Behaviorism. 
We are further encouraged to devote some time to the clarifica-
tion of postulates because Weiss demands definitions, and de-
clares tha,t he is firmly convinoed the woeful state of modern 
psychology is due to lack of definitions of fundamental notions. 
OHAPTER II 
FUNDAMENTAL OOBTRADIOTORT POSITIOBS 
1.' POSTULATES. 
Let us make a few general remarks on the necessity of 
postulates, that will resolve many misconceptions. A recent 
wri ter has well sWllll8xized the essentials: 
"A postulate is a premise which a given science 
assumes as proved. It is a starting point. Bot 
on 1y can it b41 proved, but it has been proved. To 
prove it again would be a waste of time and ener-
gy; to prove it again would be unscientific; to 
prove every postulate again would be so to limit 
and restrict human endeavor that progress in any 
of the sciences would be impOssible •••• 
There must be postulates. Everyday action de-
mands them; no science can be without them. IOre-
over, 1t is useless to admit the necessity of pos-
tulates and then fail to use them in any given 
science. "1.3 
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THE POSTULATE or BEHAVIORISM. What is the rOCk-bottom, 
funda.mental postulate upon which the whole superstructure of 
Behaviorism rests? It is Scientific Mechanism. Upon scientific 
mecha.nism, Behaviorism places all its trust, its security. Upon 
this founds.tion it builds; if the foundation is inseoure, the 
superstructure of Behaviorisll must collapse. In order tha.t ther~ 
remain no doubt about the Behavioristio Postulate, we select th4 
last of many similar conclusions and pronounoements from Wetss, 
who c loses his book with this final statement: 
"That these expressions are then paraded as 
evidence of a concord between science~and some 
narrow pleasure-pain theory of modern social 
reform, fills the true scientist with conster-
nation and doubt as to whether even the most 
advanced thinke~s on social evolution have e-
merged sufficient'l7 from their uncritical Ii t-
erary background to foresee some of the pos-
sibilities of human achievement when scientific 
mechanism is taken aP a fundamental postulate 
in human beha.!or."l~ 
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It is a historical tact tha.t the behavioristic position 
has been severely criticized by the Gestalt Psychologists of 
Germany. In our country also Behaviorism has encountered some 
opposi tioD. In his book HOld Errors and liew labels," Fulton J. 
Sheen began his essay on 'The Soul and the !wi tchings ot Behav-
iorism" with this thesis: 
'Man is a machine and the Behaviorists 
are his prophets. 115 
What kind of a machine is man? He is a reacting machine 
But Dr. Watson does not call him that; he prefers the soientifi 
and physical terminology. He calls a human being a reaotion-
mass~ What is the reaction-mass? It is an abstraction, and an 
abstraotiion cannot have a masS. Neither can the reactions of 
a reaction-mass have mass; tor they are processes, and pro-
cesses have no mass. They are on17 movements, not the things 
which move. Walking or a walk can have no mass; it is the man 
who walks that possesses the mass. Anyway, Dr. Watson i8 con-
vinced that reaction-mass is all the psychology ever needed to 
exp lain everything. 
Strictly in logical sequence with Scientific Mechanis. 
as a postulate 'is Darwinian Evolution as a oorollary. And Dr. 
watson aooording,"y lays a scientifically rejeoted oornel'-stone 
upon a soientifioally untenable foundation. Be begins his book 
entitled "Behaviorism, an Introduction to COmparative Psycholog 
with this proclamation: "The Behaviorist reoognizes no dividin 
line between man and brute •• 16 He means there is no missing-
link any more; at least, the Behaviorist does not reoognize or 
admit any such conneotion. 
If man and brute are maohines, what kind of machines 
are they? Besides being internal oombustion engines, they are 
reflex machines, whose aotivity we oall Behavior. Weiss s~ 
ma,rizes watsonian Behaviorism in his chapter on Oondi tioned 
Reflexes: "Behavior oonsists of ohained reflexes, whioh may be 
simple or ,oonditioned. ,,17 Thebehavioristio objeotive method 
is founded prinoipally on the Oonditioned Reflex, that is , a 
response is oonditioned when attached to a stimulus that did 
not originally arouse it. But exoeption has been often taken 
to the oonditioned'reflex, and so we ask: "Is it a rea,l reflex, 
one not involving oonsoiousness? And if you admit consoiousness 
whioh you have disc07ered to be unneoessary and have rejeoted, 
you manifestly oontradiot yourself. U And so Soientifio Behav-
iorism would seem to hold an unsoientifio position. 
THE POSTULATE or TRADITIONAL PSYOHOLOGY. Opposed to 
Darwinian, evolutionary, soientifio meohanism, is soientifio 
individualism, whioh renders man an ensouled, thinking animal, 
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possessing a unitary human nature. This scientific individual-
ism or moderate realism or soholastic dualism is an ever-presen 
foe to Darwinian, evolutionary, soientific mechanism. What is 
the basis for its objection? The Scholastio psyohologist de-
clares that if the Scientific Behaviorist takes evolutionary 
scientific mechanism based upon Darwin's untenable and discarde 
theory as his fundamental postulate, that Scientifio Bebavioris 
is ipsO facto unsoientifio. Why? '!'be Scholastio soientifioall 
proves that any postulate of unilinear evolution from the inor-
ganic to the organio and rational realms is no postulate, not 
even a good theory or reasonable hypothesis, and is only worthy 
of the name, "Gratuitous Assumption. It He deo lares that postu-
lates are only real postulates when they are proved premises, 
not hypotheses or dogmas. 
UNILINEAR, DARWINIAN and MECHANISTIC EVOWTION, however, 
must not be discarded, oannot be disoarded, even if untenable. 
This is the position of the Scientific Behaviorist. Be must 
retain it or else go out of business} He must ·postulate" his 
organiC evolution of man from a primitive non-living, nebulous 
mass, of evolutionary life from non-life, of man from the ape, 
the ape from the lizard, the lizard from the slime of the earth, 
the slime of the earth from a nebulous mass. Such evolution of 
electron-proton configurations from the nebulous mass, the ulti 
mate principle, is to modern soience an absolutely necessa.ry 
postulate. 
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If Darwinian Evolntion i8 a postulate aocording to the 
soientific Behaviorist, it has been taken as a starting prin-
olple for Behavlorism, and need not be proved by Psychology, bu 
by the scienoe from which it had been borrowed, that is, Anthr 
po logy. Now the same question arises: "Has Anthropology prove 
soientlfica,lly that men originated from the ape which in turn 
orlginated ultima,tely from the primeval ooze?" 
MODERN UNSCIENTIFIC SCIENCE. In 1911, Sir Arthur Keith 
deolared: "The Neanderthal type represents the stock from whic 
all modern races have arisen. uL~ But in 1916, in his "The ~ 
tlquity of Man," embodied in his ohapter on Conclusions, Sir 
Arthur Keith makes the following ~ecantation: nWe are compe11e 
to a.dmi t that men of the modern type had been in existenoe long 
before the Neanderthal type. n17 
It is an undeniable, easily verifiable historical fact 
that world history, the history of natural solenoe, and espe"'":. 
cially Anthropology form one long oonsistent refutation of the 
Darwinian Theory of constant and inevitable progress. Is it 
sCientiflc, then, for the Scientific Behaviorist to maintain 
such a disoarded, untenablt theory for his basio postulate in 
Beha,viorism? Is it scientifiC, therefore, for the Amerioan 
Association for the Advanoement of Science to make the follow-
ing dictatorial proclamation: uThe evidence in favor oftha 
evolution of man is sufficient to convince every scientist in 
19 the world."! This is a ridiculous edict, unsupported in realit 
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or bolstered up by analogous objective evidence; for "Paleonto-
logy tells us nothing on the subject - it knows no ancestors of 
man ... 19 this is a contradictory scientific attitude. 
"The on~ statement consistent with her 
dignity, that Science can make, is to say 
that she knows nothing about the origin of 
man. "20 
This scientific conclUSion and proclamation was true in 
1902; it is true for this our day, for true science ever remain 
true, yesterday, today, and forever. 
Why, then,this unscientific attitude regarding organic 
evo 1ution of the Darwinian type on the part of many scientists? 
Why does A. L. Iroeber, in his text-book entitled 'Anthropology 
begin the first sentence of the first chapter as foll1 .. : 
"Anthropology is the science of Man,H and then promptly entitle 
his second chapter, "Fossil Man," and begin here with that old 
and discarded fable, "The Kissing LLnk"?2l Why does he again 
reiterate that pet assumption of "The Missing Link," that the-
ory which was conceived by a wish of an agnostic, delivered by 
an atheist, mothered by hundreds of materialistic scientists 
who iterated and reiterated a wish and a theory, which matured 
into a "fact" of SCience, and when disproved, blossomed out int 
a "dogma" of SCience, and in our day flowered into this: "Xo 
modern zoologist has the laSt doubt as to the general fact of 
organic eTo1ution." OrganiC, unilinear evolution is the angel 
of light of modern scienceJ Do we wonder why no progress worth 
mentioning has been made in SCience, when it is based on this 
"scientifiC" assumption, organic evolution. ~ !!. Darwin? 
"Oonsequently anthropologists take as their 
starting-point the belief in the derivation of 
man from some other animal form. There is also 
~ question as to where in a general way man's 
ancestry is to be sought ••• namely, among the 
Primates, the, various monkeys a~d apes. 1122 
IS 
The italics are mine to emphasize the unscientific at-
titude of some modern scientists. 
IS THIS A MAOHINE AGE IN SOIENOE? If science is real 
and universa,l, why does not a Darwin see with the eyes of an 
Abbot Mendel? Why does not na.tural science have in the eyes of 
all scientists that objective reality and validity with which i 
is endowed? Is it because these scientists first form a pet, 
mechanical theory, and then not by natura.l selection, but by an 
artificial, unscientific selection all their own, seek for only 
those facts which substa.ntiate somewhat their own theory, and 
blind themselves to all other pertinent facts? Is it because 
they must wail with the evolutionary mechanist, Darwin, the wail 
of one who adhered not wisely but too well, who adhered exclus-
ively to the monistic and materialistic viewpoint: 
"My mind seems to have become a kind of 
machine for grinding general laws out of a 
large collection of facts ... 23 ' 
Let the scientific behaviorist beware, let him who pro-
fesses organiC, physico-chemical, electro-protonic, mechanically 
reflex, "tota in toto and tota in qual1bet parte" evolutionary 
SCience, bewareJ You get out of a machine only what you put in-
to it - no moreJ 
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HISTORIO rAOTS. What are the facts since 1S59? It is 
a historic fact that the theory of organic 
" ••• evolution has brought us materialistic 
monism, in whose barren soil nor faith, nor 
idealism, nor morality, nor art, nor any of 
the finer things of life can thrive."2~ 
And neither can nor did natural science thrive in such an un-
natural field, neither can scientific enlightenment be enkin-
dled at the torch of ho~ess- night of organic evolution with 
its monistic conception of an animalistic man. From the stand-
point of SCience, 
"Darwin's doctrine on the bestial origin 
of man brought no other gain to natural sci-
enoe than the addition of one more unveri-
fied hypothesis to its already extensive 
stock of unfounded specula.tions. -25 
OONSEQUENOES OF DARWINIAN "POSTULATE. II Now Je t the 
Scientific Behaviorist scientifica.ll1' and Sincerely a,sk himself 
"Is my funds.mental postulate for Behaviorism, postulating or-
genic and mechanical evolution, not a postulate at all, but onl 
an unverified and unverifiable hypothesis?" Too long has this 
plausible yet blinding doctrine with its pro l1fic progeny of 
eXB.ggerations, misrepresentations, and plausible formulations 
met with an all-too-readY credence on the part of unquestioning 
SCientists, who did not or perhaps could not discrimina.te betwee 
a. theory or hypothesis and a postulate, who after Darwin accept 
ed all too readily and unquestioningly an unscientific post~at 
as demonstrated beyond all Shadow of doubt. Today, in 1935, we 
see all too clearly that the solid gain to natural science from 
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the dootrine of Darwinian organio evolution has 'been neg1igibl 
but the oonsequent Dark Age in Soience has 'been unquestionably 
worse than the Dark Age from the 5th to the gth Century; for 
then there was onlY the darkness of ignorance, which needs but 
Light to rep lace it. Today we have Error, which is Darkness 
darkening Darkness, whioh is so many scientists is so impene-
trable and unapproachable tha.t it is almost beyond. the possi bi-
1i ty of scientific en llghtenment. 
CONSEQUENCES OF BEHAVIORISTIC l4ECHAHIOAL POSTULATE. 
With this postulate of Mechanical Organic Evolution, the Behav-
iorist has had the temerity to "esta.blish" the postulates for 
the Behavioristic scienoe of Ethios~ Let him beware~ Today 
Marxian Socia11sm and tile Reigh of Terror of Communism is also 
called "scientifio" for no other reason than that it too is 
based upon "pure" materialistio evolution. Today Behaviorism 
also is called soientific for no other apparent reason than 
that it combated the unsoientific and exteeme Titchenerism and 
Introspectivism, and beoause it based its stand upon nothing 
else than materialistio evolution. Its reign of terror, sinoe 
1914, ca.used the Great War in Soienoe: Its deadly doctrines are 
eo revolutionary and revolting to nature and natural science 
and. natural ethic. that even the Behaviorist himse If confesses: 
fI ••• the public mind is not yet prepared 
to receive thea, and must first be 
properly educated to accept them. •• tt26 
to accept them in the Behavioristic "scientifio" spirit. 
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REOAPITULATION THUS FAR: 
The theoretica,l basis of individual and social behavior 
aooording to the Behaviorist is evolutionary scientific mechan-
islI, of which the ultima,te elements are electrons and protons. 
!bis is the fundamental principle, this is the basic assumption. 
I repeat, Behaviorism is built upon the evolution of man from 
electrons and protons, andffrom nothing else. 
According to the Behaviorist, he is contradictorily op-
posed by all and to all previous psychologies, which he calls 
Traditional Psychology, which does include Popular Psychology, 
Soientific Psychology before 1914, and all other psychologies 
that postula,te an animistic basis for their study of human and 
anima,l l:ehavior. These all consider introspection as valid 
experimental technique. 
According to Professor WeiSS, it was his intention to 
"scrutinize fundamental assumptions" and insist upon "some 
degree of consistency in the development of the superstructure" 
of psyCh010gy.27 This we have done; and we have come to the 
following conclusion: Since the fundamental assumption of 
Unscientific Behaviorism has never been proved and yet has been 
accepted a,S a Postulate, the superstructure of Unscientific 
Behaviorism, no matter how imposing or attractive it may seem, 
collapses. The Scientific Behaviorist has been proved unsci-
entific in accepting the viewpoint that Man is a physico-che~ 
1ca1, electro-protonic, organically evolved, mechanically re-
acting, reflexly behaving combustion engine. 
2.2 
2. DEFIIITIONS. 
BEHAVIORISM DEFIDD. We are now in position to exam-
ine the def ini t ion of Behaviorism. Etymologically, Behavior-
ism would be the study of human behavior, of man's adjustment 
or ada.ptation to his environment. Prof. Weiss defines: 
"From the standpoint of the writer, 
behaviorism is the science that studles 
the origin and development of those bod-
ily movements (responses) of the indivi-
dual which esta,blish his status in the 
social organia.tion of which .e is a -
member. "28 
The Tradi tiona,l psychologist of the Scho lastic School 
would deem this definition inad.equ8,te unless the words "and 
psychic" are included after "bodily," to represent the re-
sponses of the comp:e te individual. But Prof. Weiss says: 
"For the wri ter, '~haviorisJD in psy-
chology is merely the name for that type 
of investigation and theory which assumes 
that mants educational, vocational, and 
social activities can be compJe tely de-
scribed or explained as the result of the 
same (and no other) forces found in the 
natural sciences."~9 
Earlier in this thesis, we have carefully defined what 
is commonly accepted by the term "Natural Science." But Weiss 
by this term limits hillse If only to sciences using"a measuring-
stick of wood or brass instruments. Natural science, a,s under-
,tood .~ scholastic psychology, means much more than that. It 
.HI-XlS studying na,ture wholly and accura,tely, so that soientific 
knowledge may be gained and verified by whoever wishes to do so 
at whatever time and place he wishes to do so, if he provide on 
11 identioal experimental oonditions. But the Behaviorist will 
not fa,ce everyday facts of human experienoe, and must c ling to 
pet theories and unscientifiobeliefs: 
"For the writer behaviorism represents, 
as it does for many others, a protest a-
ga,inst all attempts to explain human aohieve-
ment by the introduction of an element which 
is beyond the ra.nge of the physical measure-
ment. I be lieve ths.t human achievement is of 
the same order as the inorganic and organic, 
prooesses which Brevail in the physico-che~ 
ical universe. "3 
EVidently here we have the point of departure between 
behaviorism and scho lasticism. The beha.viorist himself plainly 
realizes that no U41iformi ty can 'be reached in such a oontro-
versial and contradiotory atmospb3 re. He summarizes the view-
points of the opponents; but unfo~tunately, like many non-pht-
losophioal scientists, he fails to distinguish between a postu-
late, which can be proved and has been proved and upon which a 
less fund.a,mental science buildS, and a hypothesis which has not 
been proved. These are. his own words: 
"There are two types of postulates accor6-
ing to which human behavior and human achieve-
ment can be explained: (1) Physical causation, 
according to which human achievement is the 
product of nothing but the physical processes 
and structures which make up the body and the 
environment, and in which the sole datum of 
existence is the electron-proton totality; 
(2) Psychical causation, according to which 
human achievement is the product of some 
entity which is not completely describable 
under the electron-proton assumptions. "31 
Too many hypotheses in the dress of postulates, and beliefs 
which are merely subjecti'Ve longings have been expressed by 
the Scientific Behaviorist. Let us conolude this passage with 
another citation from the Scientific Behaviorist, Weiss, in 
which enough beliefs are expressed to make of Behaviorism not 
8. Science but a Religion, the Religion of Mechanica.l llvolution: 
• 
"I believe that eventually psyohology will 
be reoognized as an interlocking segment 
through which the social sciences will become 
e.n extension of the natural sciences. As an 
educa.tional problem our who Ie conception of 
science will probably ohange. Physioal soi-
ence has not serious~ interfered with tradi-
tional beliefs of either the educated or ~ 
eduoated; biologioal soience and the theory 
of organio evolution in partioular has been 
widely aocepted by the eduoated and is begin-
ing to be aocepted by the uneduoated; the 
sooial scienoe of the future will introduce 
the conoeption'of sooial evolution whioh will 
brand as illusion and error a much greater 
pel'oentage of long oherished beliefs and 
id.eals, but this sacrifice is now scarcely 
anticipated by the educated and is entirely 
unsuspected by the masses of mankind. "32 
With such a platform Behaviorism olaims to be ~ one 
and only psychology.' It olaims to displace a.l1 others, to 
ma,ke them unnecessaryJ This is not sCienoe, this is a oode or 
oult unguided by objeoti'Ve evidenoe. Behaviorism violates its 
own code from the very beginning. It dema~s objectivism, and 
yet passes judgment promisouously, and uses but one touchstone 
for all its judgments-the magic word, :MATTER. If it is not 
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.at ter , it is wrong, it is inadmissible. Absolutely, and let 
it be noted, ~ priori~ There exists nothing but Matter. Why? 
Beoause Behaviorism says soJ Its only obje~tive knowledge is 
the physioal world. This is opinion or madness, but not scienc 
A SUMMARY CONTRASTING UNSCIENTIFIC BEHAVIORISM AND 
SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY. Let it be noted clea.rly: 
1. Behaviorism rests upon the theory of unsoientific 
evolution; experimental traditional psychology upon the faot 
of a vital, organizing and unifying principle, the souL 
2. Behaviorism seeks to explain all by the evolving 
and gyrating configurations of electrons and protons; although 
Traditional Psyohology admits moderate evolution restricted to 
definite orders of beings, scientifically it m~st deny that 
evolution is an adequate explanation of all the phenomena and 
experimental findings in psychology. 
3. Behaviorism posits sooial evolution due to intrin-
sio changes in the configuration of complex electron-proton 
oombinations; Traditional psychology admits social evolution, 
but oannot scientifically admit the evolution of that funda-
mental unit of society, the individual human nature. 
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3. OBJECTIVES. 
PURPOSE OF nISS AND PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS IDENTIOAL: 
AThis book is an attempt to bridge over the 
gaps between traditional, popular, and behav-
ioristic psychology by showing their inter-
re lations. The underlying p Jan of the book 
is to present fundamental principles of be-
haviorism as the writer sees them, and to 
compare them with the most important concep-
tions in traditional subjective psychology 
and the sociological systems that are based 
upon it. 1133 
After pointing out that Titchenerism was traditional 
subjective psychology, and that Scholastic or Neo-Scholastic 
psychology is subjectively and objectively SCientific, we sub-
scribe to the noble purposes expressed by Professor Weiss. 
CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS. The Behaviorist maintains: 
"Thus, in the last analysis, human behavior 
is reduced to movements between electron-proton 
systems, but this reduction is the final aim of 
all scientific investigation. As an expedient 
in social co-operation, the behaviorist special-
izes in the study of those complex forms of mo-
tion, which, for want of a better classificatio~ 
are designated as the personal, domestic, profes-
Sional, publip, moral, esthetic, scientific 
activities. 1f3~ 
But the Scholastic psycho logist mainta.ins: Human be-
havior is ultimately reduced to movements of the soul, which 
cannot be reduced to electron-proton systems. 
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These positions contradict one another; consequently, 
both cannot be right~ 
STATE or THE QUESTION. That man or beast or plant is 
a particular systematic configuration or electron-proton pat-
tern can be a,dmi tted; that man or other living being possesses 
a vital principle as a unifying principle is only admitted by 
the scho lastic and popular psychology. 
That this vital principle is not demonstrable direotly 
by wooden measuring-stioks or brass instruments or other mate-
rial instruments of preCision, is universally admitted; that 
it, therefore, is nonexistent is generally affirmed and taken 
for granted by non-soho lastic psychologists, and just as in-
sistently denied by the scholastiC, as an unwarranted, inde-
monstrable, unscientific conclusion, based upon preconceived 
theories. 
rinally, Neo-Scholasticism and Scientific Psychology 
maintain that Behaviorism, with oversimplification, with the 
building up of complioated patterns of behavior by the inte-
gration of simple reactions, by seeing only stijuli and re-
sponses and enchanted by its magic formula, B-R, expreSSing 
nothing but conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, it oan 
never scientifically and adequately aohieve its purpose and 
a,rrive at its objective. 
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CHAPTER III. 
MONI8l( vs. DUALISM. 
1. HUllAS EEHAVIOR AND PHYSICS. 
BEHAVIORISJ( AND PHYSICS. Thus far we have seen that 
Behaviorism is seriously attempting to make the psychology of 
human behavior, to make a non-mathema,tical science mathematical 
to make the psychical aspect of human behavior physical, and to 
identify the physical with material. Is human behavior the ef-
fect only of a physical force? Or is there a,nother force that 
may be negatively expressed as a non-physical force and posi-
tively expressed as a psychical force? If it does eXist, .ust 
it not be recogni zed in order that human behavior may be ad-
equately and scientifically suudied? 
Is human behavior the result of a physical force only? 
The Scientific Beha:viorist c Jaims "scientificallT" that it is. 
But to establish this claim scientifically, he must reduce all 
human activity or behavior to one physical or material princi-
ple of activity, to the Energy of Physics. He is attempting an 
impossible task ~prima facie, for it is clearly evident that 
physical matter as studied by Physics, is dead and lifeless and 
killed if previously alive, and therefore can never give an ad-
','luste explanation of vital behavior. Sinoe non-living phy-
.1cal substanoes do not possess all of the following oharao-
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i t,ristios of living oreatures, whioh are found speoifically in 
each representative: 
1. Dafini te size. 
2. Definite shape. 
3. Definite chemioaloomposition. 
4. Dafini te organization. 
5. Definite immanent aotivity - metabolism. 
b. Definite reduplioation of itself - reproduotion. 
7. Definite responses following with physioal but 
not absolute neoessi ty - irritability; 
therefore, a fortiori, human behavior, being a study of life 
and of living aotivities, is entirely out of the soientifio 
scope of physios, and oonsequently out of the realm of the 
Monistio Behaviorist. 
View of MECHANISTIC PSYCHOLOGIST and BEHAVIORIST. 
"The SOientist, however, will regard the 
physical eXp'lanation /eleotron-proton oon-
figurations7 as the better working hypothe-
sis, at It ast in his own field, al.though he 
too may have oertain reservations as to the 
adequaoy of physical oausation when he oon-
siders such aotivities as morality, religion, 
art, eto., in whioh he is on the Same level 
with the poet or non-soientifio individual. 
The behaviorist, however, is faoed with 
the problem of desoribing humanlChievements 
in the most aoourate and uniform of all 
languages (mathematics). The traditional 
spirit or psyohical conoeption oannot be 
thus desoribed. -35 
It is familiar and oommonplaoe history that Desoartes 
a.ttempted to ma.ke philosophy, a non-mathematioal sOienoe, m~ 
thematioal. He, genius though he was, failed, for he attempted 
the impossible. Shall history and its Eailures be repeated? 
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ARISTOTLE'S WARNING. The Stagiri te cautioned subse-
quent generations that not all sciences can be 8xpected to 
yield the same mathematical certitude that the metaphysical 
science of mathematics can. Over two thousand years ago, the 
pythagoreans made the same mistake. Shall we not learn from 
their error and profit from Aristotle's admtnition? Descartes 
did not learn; he a.ttempted to make philosophy mathematical,. 
and failed. Neither is psychology mathematics. If it is, then 
Behaviorism and Psychology cease to be, cease to eXist, have 
absolutely no claim to existenceJ "Entia non sunt multiplicand 
sine necessitate;" so Occam's razor would dispose of the Scien-
tific Behaviorist. 
Shall we or can we ever get mathematical certitude in 
the study of human behavior? Here is the opinion of Aristotle, 
as paraphrased by that Aristotelian authority, W. D. Ross: 
"We must be content to answer it with the 
accuracy of which the SUbject-matter permits. 
Ethics is concerned with 'things which are 
for the most part so,, 'things whioh are cap-
able of being otherwise,' and we must not ex-
pect in it the perfect demonstrations that 
a.re possible for a SCience, which, like ma-
thema.tics, deals with t things that are of ne-
ceSSity. ' 
Ethics reasons not from but to first prin-
Ciples; it starts not with what is intellig-
ible in itself but with wha.t is familiar to 
us, i.e., with the bare facts, and works back 
from them to the underlying reasons ••• Mathe-
matics deale with a SUbject-matter the first 
principleS of whioh are acquired by an easy 
abstraction from sense-data; the substance of 
mathematics is the deduction gf conclUSions 
from these first princip]a s. ",,6 
.,.------------------------------_--...1 
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This same sound opinion can be readily applied to the 
, physiCal sciences and Beha,viorism. We can never demand that the 
~ariable element in human behavior will give us the metaphysical 
certitude of mathematics, or that Experimental Psychology and 
Soientific Behaviorism is, must be, or ever can be Mathematics 
cr Physics; for at tbat moment they would cease to be distinct 
loiences. Shall, then, the Bebaviorist maintain: 
"When we are faced with the problem of 
adopting a fundamental assumption toward 
which the analysis of human behavior might 
regress, the physicist's electron-proton 
ultimate theory has the advantage, 
(1) that it can be stated in tbe most 
effective language responses (matbematics) 
that have been developed; 
(2) that it can be syntheSized into a,toms, 
molecules, protoplasm, animals, man, Social 
organization, and (3) that it can be communica,ted from one 
individual to another so that a uniformity 
(verifiability) among the responses of many 
individuals can be and has been established. 1137 
He realizes the only other alternative that can explain 
uma,n heha,vior, for he immediately continues: 
"On the other hand, the ultimate realities 
of the professional meta,physician, such as 
'thing in i tse 1f ,,' ente lechy, e!an vi tal, 
psychical force, are fictions which cannot 
be measured, verified, or syntheSized into 
anything more unified than is implied by the 
term uniqueness, which can neither be demoa-
. strated nor defined. This is the reason why 
I adopted the electron-proton type of bypa-
thesis as best adapted for the study of human 
behavior. N38 
What an unscientific position the Scientific Behaviorist 
maintains~ Since, as he says, the entelechy or psychical force 
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~nnot be measured, it i8 not an ultimate reality, but a fic-
~1onl Anything that oannot be measurec!, synthesized a.nd thus 
y.rified in a ohemioal labora.tory, is fiction for the Scientifi 
B.hRviorist1 Love, loya~ty, patriotism, must be fiotions, too, 
for they cannot be measured i~ a ohemioal or physical laborato 
Jloause the enteleohy, postulated as absolutely neoessary by a 
.oientist, Driesoh, who dared to faoe the faots when he faced 
the reality of the human being, and thereupon modified his the-
ories to fit the faots, because the enteleohy of Aristotle, of 
Aquinas, and of ho .. at,. 8c"ent:1fic psychology cannot be synthe-
dr-ed or measured by ms.terial measuring-sticks, the Scientific 
Behaviorist declares most unscientifically: "This is the reason 
,hy I a.dopted the electron-proton type of hypotheSiS as best a4-
apted for the study of human behavior. "39 Such a starting prin-
ciple that is clearly wrong in its germ can never germinate in-
to truth subsequent lYe 
How oan the Beha.viorist maintain such a narrow and re-
atricted and erroneous position regarding human behavior? He 
Ilistook a theory of biology for s, postulate of a stable soience 
of human behavior. This is bad scienoeJ We have just indicated 
that behavioristic logic, philosophy are, to say the least, ver 
questionable. How came it about that the Behaviorist accepts in 
regard to human behavior, scientific mechanism, which is phy-
Sically mechs,nistic, anthropologically evolutionary!. !!. Darwin, 
unreal, and therefore unscientific? It is ultimately due to the 
SCientifio revolt of Scienoe from Philosophy in the Sixteenth 
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oentury. Follow1ng upon the d1soover1es of Ga11leo and the 
Rat1ona11sm of Sp1noza, the teleolog10al pr1n01ple aooount1ng 
for man's or1g1n 
" ••• and of God's dealings with man, is replaoed 
by the prinoip Ie of meohanism. Sc1enoe has now 
beoome identified 1n men's minds w1th the quan-
titative laws of motion. The Oopern10an revol-
ution had further emPhasized the meaning of the 
meohanioal theory •• ~o 
DEVOLUTION or MONISTIO SOIENOE. From this time, it is 
assumed that the prooesses of life may be desoribed as quanti-
ties of meohanioal foroe or energy. Th1s is universal meohan-
ism, but not universal truth. Suoh going baok to inanimate na-
ture to expla,in life and vital prooesses may be "soientifio" 
naturalism, but it is unnatural soienoe. Suoh a view of human 
behavior ident ifies reality with this world, exp lioi tly main-
tains by "the who Ie world" noth1ng mor e than the sens1ble world 
of ma,tter. Yet such a point of v1ew is str10tly orthodox and 
scientific aocord1ng to the Behaviorist, but it is quite ~ 
scientifio when 1ts subjeot-matter 1s human behavior, beoause 
suoh 8, realism exp11citly repudiates every spiritual or moral 
reality. And the fountain-head of this unscientifio realism is 
the restricted view of So1enoe: "Sc1enoe is Physios," or again, 
"Soienoe is Mathemat10s." This 1s not a postulate, this is a 
prepossession] Whatever else it may be, it oerta1nlY is not 
sOienoe. 
Although the Dualist denies universal meohan1sm and 
organio evolution, he does not deny all evolution. But he does 
.eny that these dogmas of the modern unscientific scientist are 
Science, and that the Scientific Behaviorist has proved the fo 
lowing facts by means of Darwinian organic evolution: 
1. Origin of life from non-life. 
2. Origin of anima 1 life from plant life. 
3. Origin of human ~fe from animal life, i.e., 
from ape-life. 
4. Origin of all human activities from matter alo 
ThiS attitude of the Dualist is scientific. But the following 
atti tude is not: 
~The combined implications of cosmic and 
biological evolution have destroyed com-
pletely the foundations for the hypothesis 
of human uniqueness or primac7.·~r 
Professor Barnes is clearly not talking as a soientist 
when he makes that statement. Since when can conc lusions from 
hypotheses be aocepted for verified facts? Is it any wonder 
that Professor Ryan of the Oatholic University objects: 
"Evo lution is supposed to have made untenable 
any theory about nature whioh is not rigorously 
deterministic ••• and essentially materialistic •• 
It is to evolutionism as a philosophy that we 
Object ••• How the truth of biological evolution 
gives one the right to postulate that ab initio 
everything was a primordial undifferentiated 
mass of atoms, or that thought and ma.tter are 
at bottom one and the same, or that noumenal 
and phenomena,l are but aspects of a common re-
a Ii ty, or that human ethics is either a ma,tter 
of conventiona or the result of economic deter-
mine,tiona, or that God i8 but the construction 
of our own fear impulses---all of this has as 
much to do with the results of biology as the 
fantastic elephant which supported the fantas-
tic tortoise which supported the world of In-
dian my tho-philosophy has to do with modern 
physical science.·~2 
2. HOKAN BEHAVIOR AND PHYSIOAL MOTION 
IS HUKAI BEHAVIOR PHYSIOAL MOTION ONLY? What stand 
does the Behaviorist maintain? 
'When human behavior is studied as a form 
of motion differing only in complexity from 
the motions and dynamics of physics and me-
chanics, behaviorism assumes the systemat'ic 
status of physical monism, of whioh electrons 
and protons ha~e been acoepted as the ultim-
ate elements. ".,,~ . 
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But human nature is coordinated in its activities, it 
is oonsoious of an abiding entity during multiform reactions, 
and this knowledge is immediate so that any possibility of er-
ror is excluded. How does the Behaviorist account for this 
unity midst multiplicity in human behavior? 
"In adopting physical monism any conscious 
or psyohical entity as distinct from the phy-
sical elecif;l."on-proton entity is, of course, 
excluded. I q.. 
The Behaviorist does not account for-the human princi-
ple of unity a.midst the Dlultiplici ty of reactions; he simply 
excludes, he does not explain. Such is the sterility of Behav-
iorism which hopes to supplant Traditional Psychology~ 
. 
How does the Dualist meet this problem of individuali.ty 
amidst multiplicity? What is the ultimate basis of all human 
achievement? It is a soul, an individual soul for each organis 
'nd the unifying principle of all its activity, that known and 
illIllediately recognized abiding entity persisting through and 
,aooounting for all human behavior and achievement. Deny it, 
and yOU accept an impossible contradiction, a million of inde-
pendent, individual cellular units organized by chance with a 
production of billions of variegated, incoordinated processes~ 
ThiS surely will not advance the scientific study of personalit 
and social organi~ation. This is disorganization, chaos. Weis 
himself admit_ the difficulty, for it is inescapable. 
HIn other words, I assume that the scien-
tific study of what is generally known as 
personality and social organization can be 
conducted under the assumption that the phy-
sico-chemical continuum is the sole existen-
tial datum and that the totality of the el-
ectron-proton aggregates is the universe in 
which we live. "'5 
Explicitly, then, the Scientific Behaviorist while mainta.1ning 
8 cont inuum denies individua.li ty of that continuum, denies per-
sonality, and BO affirms and denies that a thing is undivided 
and d,ivided at the same time under the same conditions. ThiEl 
violates that most fundamental principle, the principle of 
contradiction. weiss realizes his untenable position, and 
bravely attempts to ameliorate his irreconcilable, unscientific 
behavior; then, finally, gives up the hopeless situation. 
"Of course, I do not imply that human 
achievement can now be reduced to the 
electron-proton formulation. Nei~her is 
this possible in physics itself.·~6 
Truth must out. The Scientific Behaviorist condemns 
imself of bain unscientific 
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intrinsically impossible will never become possible. Yet he 
qualifies his admission. It is impossible now, but perchance 
it may be possible later, perhaps aeons later. But this will 
not save an impossib~ situation. Whatever is of its very na-
ture impossible, can never become possible, for not even the 
Almighty ca,n ha,rmonizepcontrad_ictories. If it were pOSSible, 
scientific study, and therefore, Scientific Behaviorism would 
be impossible, would be sheer nonsense. But Professor Weiss 
Is consistent and, loyal to his pet theory although he well 
knows his precarious position and contemporary opposition: 
"There are some eminent physicists 
(Millikan, Lodge, Whitehead, Pupin) 
who claim that the mechanical con-
ception is inadequate."~7 
And so end all of the explanations of human phenomena 
under the tutelage of the Scientific Behaviorist. They do not 
explain. That is the reason why Behaviorism has been known as 
the Sterile Science. Physics oan never tecome Psychology. 
And so we conclude, in spite of the energe*io Behavior 
ist, that physioal motion, phySical energy, the parallelogram 
of forces, or in a word, the physical energetic theory of mo-
dern psychology, and particularly of Behaviorism, is entirely 
inadequate to explain, or even begin to explLin vital phenomen 
Now we are faced with the problem of discovering why 
and how the Scientific BehaViorist has assumed such an unsoi-
entific attitude, why he has been complicated and involved in 
such an impossible scientific Situation. 
HISTORIOAL REVIEW or "ENERGY~" Aristotle originated 
the term "energeia," which, however, the modern psychologist 
does not use in the same sense. Energy to Aristotle meant 
actual manifestation of any change, not merely physics,l or 
material change. The Power or Latent Potentiality was called 
'd£namis;" the result of the change is what the Scholastimcall 
"actus," or "act, II due to something "in energy, If or according 
to Aristotle, "'en~rgeit. ,,'8 He gives the following illustra-
, 
tlon: During the waking state, an act of knowing occurs act~ 
ally or "in energy," whereas during s ~ep there exists only the 
"power" to know. 
PHYSIOAL SOIENCE IMPROVES ON ARISTOTLE] But physical 
science appropria.ted these theoretical terms as her o'WflJ The 
result, too often forgotten, or perhaps never realized, is 
evidently a superiority complex of unscientific manouvers. Here 
are some of the evolutionary changes introduced into the hypo-
thesis of mental energy, as first correctly conceived and de-
finitely promulgated by Aristotle, and "modified" by later 
"science: " 
(1) rirst of all, this concept of energy became re-
stricted to material phenomena. Energy now claimed reference 
solely to physical movements, but no longer concerned itself 
with mental changes, as for example, in processes of knowing. 
(2) Since the Reaaissance, potency and a.ot of the 
\I .. ~ • Scholastic, or the dunamis and energeia of Aristotle, have be-
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oome the Potential Energy and Kinetic Energy of the scienoe of 
PhysiOS, a persistent entity, always identioally the same, at 
one time latent, and. at another time manifest. 
(3) "The third ohange---and that whioh is of 
the greatest importanoe for us s.t present---
consisted in assuming this persistent energy 
to be transferable from one thing to another. "49 
And thus mental energy became by a process of evolution or de-
volution---neural energy} Wm. MCDougall, for example, writes 
rega,rding contemporary views as follows: 
"The constituent neurones of the nervous 
system with all their branches are regarded 
as a vast system of channels in all parts of 
which potential chemical energy is consta.ntly 
being transformed, in virtue of the normal 
vi ta.l activity of the neurones, into a par-
ticular form of active energy. "50 
Let this disoussion suffice to trace the materializa-
tion of mental energy into physical energy. By recognizing a 
vi ta 1 principle distinot from ma.tter Aristotle ~orJtulated his 
his hylomorphio theory of matter and form, a.nd form he oalled 
energy (energeia.); by disoarding a vital principle, or soul, 
the materialistio soientist of today olings to his physical 
Energetic Theory as suffioient to explain Psychological pheno-
mena. 
The next question, then, to be investigated is to dis-
cover whether any or all modern Physical Energetio Theories, 
which are held by praotioally all non-soholastio sOientists, 
including the Behavioristio psychologists, are sufficient to 
eXplain human behavior with emphasis on psyohologioal phenomena. 
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ENERGETIC THEORY pr PHYSICS USELESS .,R PSYCHIC AOTS. 
Can any physical energetic theory explain psychological 
phenomena? ¥odern psychologies have built up elaborate mathe-
eatical theories and ingenious physical "Energetic Theories" 
for solving distinct problems of human behavior, as in the op-
eration of knowlng. They have strung together raw facts, dif-
ferent interpretation of these facts, and the outcome was a 
host of Laws, not laws in the sense of PhYSics, but descrip-
tions as of some puerile science~ These psychological Jaws are 
in the main truths which the common people know but which the 
Unscientific Psychologists seem to have discovered for the firs 
time. Here are some fundamental "Laws" of modern Scientific 
Psychology: 51 
(~ A person has more or less power to observe 
what goes on in his own mind. He can know that he 
knows. (The Old ScholastiC called it "Reflection~) 
(2) When a person has in mind any two or more 
ideas, he has more or less power to bring to mind 
any relations that essentially hold between the .. 
This the modern psychologist calls the Eduction of 
Relations. (It is "Judgment" for the Old ScholastiC.) 
(3) Third and la.t law is the Eduction of the 
Corre late s: When a person has in mind any idea 
together with a relation, he has more or less po-
wer to bring up into mind the correlative idea. 
yes, and the Old ScholastiC and Aristotle knew 
and expressed this too. 
But no highly technical scientific terminology, no 
physical or physiological version of mental energy can Show 
how an electron has the innate power to ref ~ ct upon i tsel!, 
no Scientific Behaviorist dan demonstrate how an electron and 
proton oan eduoe such oorrelates, as, e. g., "father and son," 
Itrbite and blaok," eto. 
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It i~ true and undenia.ble, therefore, that often our 
physiologioal energy is interrelated with psyohical energy, but 
we must ma,intain when faoing real faots that in Some operations 
often known &.s the higher funotions of the soul, the psyohical 
energy is intrinsioally and essentially independent, as in such 
abstract conoepts of "love and devotion," or in experienoes 
with logical memory of transoendental relationships. 
Likewise, without an abiding entity known by the 
Scholastic as "Person" or the "Ego" it is impossible to ao-
count for the "mental span" required in a judgment or a oor-
relation. There would be nothing whioh would do the oomparing, 
the judging, or the oorrelating; surely, the unrelated protons 
and eleotrons oould not do it. And thus we are foroed to con-
clude by objeotive evidence and a sane consideration of all 
the faots that discrete eleotrons and protons, behaving inde-
pendently, absolutely independent of eadh other and integra,ted 
by no unitary principle, ensouled by no vitalizing and ener-
gi zing prinoip Ie whose identity remains essentially oonstant, 
can never account for nor adequately explain the higher cog-
nitive prooesses by any energetic theory or hypothesis whioh 
meinta.ins that mental energy "in toto" is nothing more than 
physioal energy It in toto." 
;. HOlUB SCHAVIOR AND DUALISJI 
HYLOJlORPHIO THEORY. We shall endeavor to utilize in 
this discussion some of the general principles of modern and 
contemporary psychology as a confirmation of Aristotelian a,nd 
Scholastic scientific,psychology. Recently Robert Woodworth, 
Professor of Psychology at Oolumbia University affirmed: 
NThe first principle of psychology is 
contained in the definition (psychology 
is the science of the activities of the 
individual), and that the individual acts 
a,s a unit. Without this fundamental prin-
Ciple, often called the "organismic prin-
ciple," it would be impossible to explain 
anything in psychology. "52 
Since the Scientific Behaviorist conceives man as a 
combustion engine made up of a billion more or less individual 
entities, and explicitly rejects this first principle of psy-
cho logy, according to Woodworth, tha,t Behaviorist would find it 
impossible to explain anything in psychology. The sterility of 
Behaviorism vindicates Professor WOodworth. 
In his "Jlodern Jlaterialism and Emergent Evolution,N 
published in 1929, Profeaaor I'm. JlcDougall analyzes the beha-
vior of living bodies, and then enunciates a conclusion con-
sona,nt to the objective evidence of experimental data: 
"It appears on the face of it that the 
living body is the'scene of events which 
require for their explanation both mecha-
nist ic and te leo logical princ iples. The 
acceptance of such mixed principles for 
living organisms is the essence of doc-
trines commonly called vitalistic. And 
within the field of psychology or physio-
logical psychology the acceptance of such 
mixed principles is called dualism or 
interactionism; for it implies the inter-
action of mechanistic and of teleological 
or mental events. "53 
MCDougall merely restates the old problem of unity in 
due.li ty, which had been first recognized and solved aright by 
Aristotle, and which can be solved today only by establishing 
a similar Aristotelian hylomorphic theory in our study of h~ 
man behavior. To deny that natural events are not of two dis-
tinct orders, the physical and the mental, is not Science but 
Nescience, is Folly, because it is a denial of undeniable fact. 
Vital energy of two orders, mechanical and mental, de-
mands in a living individual but one energizer or energist, 
which Aristotle called Ente1echy54 and St. Thomas of Acquin, 
the Prince of the Scholastics, called Form. 55 To avoid sub-
sequent misunderstanding, we shall the vital principle, soul 
or ente lechy. 
This is not a departure to Kedieyal or Ancient times. 
As late as 1929, Hans Dr1esch in his "The Science and Philo-
sophy of the Organism" uses the same terminology invented by 
Aristotle. And Hans Driesch knows whereof he speaksJ He has 
long 'studied animal behavior, he ana17zed the phenomena of life 
: and death, as was forced as a result of experimentation 
" ••• to conclude to a coordinating vital prin-
ciple in living orgl!i,nisms absent in dead mat-
ter, for organic growth from a single ferti-
lized ovum is othl~wise inexplicable---and so 
is regeneration."~ 
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But might not a machine located in the germinal Anlage 
of Weissman save the position of the Scientific Behaviorist1 
Driesch denies this possibility according to his own definition 
of a machine: 
"A machine is a typical configura,tion 
of physical and chemical constituents by 
the acting Qf whioh a typical effect is 
attained. 115, 
But how oan the meohanical conception account for 
that wonderful phenomenon, regenera,tion? Divide, for example, 
s fertili~ed ovum; you obtain two completely evolved and deve-
loped organisms. Divide a machine, and instead of getting two 
machines, you get no machine. Such reconstructive ability is 
found only in living matter and must be of a non-mechanical na-
ture. And thus we conclude scientifically with Aristotle: 
.. The soul or ente lechy is the princ ip Ie 
or energizer in the vital processes of nu-
trition, sensation, intellection, and mo-
tivation. 
"Broadly spit aking, the sOU16iS the es-sence of a determined body. "5 
II Therefore, the soul is the first aot 
-of a natural body having life in potenoy."57 
II The soul is the princip Je of nutri tion 
sensation, intelleotion, and motivation.";! 
"The soul i8 the prinoi~le by which we 
live and feel and know. 115~ , 
Aristotle built his Psychology on his Scientifio Biology} 
OHAPTER IV. 
GElfJ:RAL PSYCHOLOGY • 
.le DEFINITIONS. 
If we define psyohology as the soienoe of oonsoious 
life, then we oan personally verify the following faots pSJ-
aho logioally by means of internal observation, soientifioally 
designated as the method of Introspeotion: 
(3) 
Nutritive prooesses are unoonsoious prooesses. 
Sensitive prooesses are consoious prooesses in 
whioh a speoialized organ is required. 
Intellectual prooesses are oonsoious prooesses 
in whioh no organs are oonsoiously required. 
During intelleotual prooesses we a,re not aware of the 
6r~~ aotion no matter how intently we attend as we most sure-
ly are when we oonsciously attend to the prooesses aooompanying 
a sensa,tion of touch. 
From our previous cUscussion, we are foroed to limit 
the term "menta.l energy" 'to intelleotual prooesses, to purely 
psychioal processes requiring no admixture of material or phy-
sical elements. This indicates our position regarding the 
higher prooesses, namely: The soul is intrinsioally independent 
of matter, although matter is a condition sine-qua-non for fur-
nishing the soul "food for thought" in the form of sensuous reo-
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presentations of objects and entities; in brief, the human soul 
is merely extrinsica lly dependent on matter in cognitive prOw 
cesses• 
~ REOAPlTULATION OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSION BY DEFINITIONS. 
McDougall, the former ps,riah of the scientific world because he 
championed the existence of a soul, in his "Body and Mind" says 
DEFINING NEGATIVELY: 
2. 
1. 
2. 
The soul is non-material, for it hs,s not 
extension or ponderability; therefore, 
it is not subject to the laws of 
mechanis~ . 
Non-mechanics.l te leo logical factors com-
pel us to adopt the hypothesis of the 
soul as an inextended immaterial 
substance. 
DEFINING POSITIVlLY: 
The soul is a psychic being. 
The soul is a substance, a sum of endur-
ing capacities for thoughts, feelings, 
and efforts of determinate kinds. 
The soul is a unitary being or entity be-
cs.use of unity of consciousness. 
The soul,being Simple, undergoes no de.-
velopment during life, for its capacities 
are fulq present as latent potentialities 
from the beginning. 
The mental differences exhibited by any 
person at different stages of his life 
would thus be wholly due to the f.evel-
opment during life of the bra,in and, 
subsequent degenerative changes of 
this brain structure. nbO 
Now we have established an adequate foundation for 
the study of human behavior in accord with the most exacting 
requirements of scientific eaperimental psychology, and are 
prepared to investigate the Soul, Consciousness and Mind, and 
the Subject "I" or the Ego scientifically and psychologically. 
J:MPtRIO PSYCHOLOGY. 
DEnnD: !}D::SCIJ:BOE; or' PSYCHIO OO_SOIOUS KOVEJlENT. 
IS THE OONOEPT or SOUL ENTIRELY A NEGATIVE OONOEPT? 
We have proved that psychology, in order to be a nat-
ural science, must deal not only with matter, but with a con-
scious self. The Behaviorist, however, objects to a non-
material entity: 
"But if the properties of this psychical 
entity are only negative, that is, non-ma-
terial, non-neural, non-chemical, etc., no-
thing is gained, and the principle, viz., 
that no new factors shall be assumed until 
established principles have been demonstrated 
to be in,dequate, seems the logical course to 
follow. nol 
At this point it is necessary to introduce a pertinent 
discussion on "a,nalogous concepts and on negations, and their 
contribution to scientific knowledge. Does a negation always 
deny absolutely? Does not a negation furnish some thing posi-
tive at times? When Behaviorism negated Titchenerism because 
the latter was running unscientifically wlld, did it not ipso 
facto produce a posl tive contribution for Psychology? A negat-
ive statement does not always lmply a negatlve concept, e.g., 
when I assert that the Behaviorlst is not a Phllosopher or a 
Sclentlst, I do not wish to assert that he ls not, that ls, tha 
i does not exist. We must, therefore, conc lude that there are 
some concepts, which although expressed negatively are neve~ 
theless not a,bsolutely or purely nega.tive, but relatively or 
indirectly produce a most positive concept, although it may be 
an inadequate concept, e.g., of God, of the human soul, etc. 
In scholastic terminology such concepts are called analogous or 
negative-positive concepts. Since these are very true concepts 
it follows that the concept of the soul is true and so corres-
ponds to reality. In such wise are all spiritual substances 
recognized by the human intellect which knows the spiritual be-
ing only indirectly through precisions and abstractions from 
matter. Such knowledge is negative under one aspect, and most 
positive under another; it is imperfect scientific knowledge, 
yet most true scientific knowlddge. 
Professor Gruender of the Depa~tment of Psychology at 
St. Louis University, in "Psychology without a Soul,· writes: 
"The spiritual soul is a substance; that is 
the positive element, it is, however, unlike 
the material substance, it is 'im-material,' 
i.e., not material; and this is the negative 
element. But •• it is one thing to say that our 
knowledge of a thing is imperfect, in fact ve-
ry imperfect, and quite another thing to say 
tha t we have ..... lepuat no knowledge, no 
knowledge at all. Those who reject all know-
ledge of the spiritual soul, because in our 
present life it 18, and must necessarily be, 
imperfect, do what a dissatisfied nurse is 
warned not to do: they pour out the baby with 
the bath,' as a German proverb has it. H02 
Some wit has said, was it McDougall, they have even 
discarded the bath-tubJ 
1. 
EMPIRIO PSYCHOLOGY 
I.e CONSCIOUS KOTIOll AND THE SOUL. 
That the Boul is not an entirely negative oonoept, 
but that it signifies a positive reality, is the inevitable 
conclusionf'drawn from the previous disoussion. We will now 
proceed to more positive experimental or empirioal data. 
Human beha~ior proves the existenoe of the soul as 
is testified by the universal experienoe of all men. Suoh 
human behavior is the sUbjeot-matter of experimental psyoho-
logy. Here is a oonfirmation of the Soholastio and Dualistio 
Posi tion produced and gra,nted by the Jehaviorist himself. We 
quote Professor Weiss: 
"When the behavi.orist aotually tries to 
determine whioh of these oonoeptions (i.e., 
the soul, either material or non-material) 
has been most effeotive in impressing it-
self as a pedagogioal prinoiple in our edu-
oational praotioe, Stout's oonoeption that 
mind is to be regarded as a non-material 
causal agent (the funotional point of view) 
approaches nearest to the one whioh pre-
vai Js in actual 0 lass-room and every-day 
praotice, no matter how much it mey be re-
pudiated in the prefaoe of the tex~6bookS 
or in the theoretioal disoussions." 3 
Suoh pres*ing, stubborn human behavior implicitly and 
explioitly vindicating the existence of a soul should give 
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the Behaviorist warning not to fly "in the face of facts," not 
to be out of step with human nature and human behavior. His 
province as a scientist is not primarily to refashion human be-
bavior but to study hunan behavior as it is. TRUTH gI18ves him: 
"After students have been carefully trained 
to observe the fine distinctions involved in 
the mind- body re lationtthlp, they forget them 
a"S soon as they leave the university. When 
they get into the business or professional 
world, they adopt the popular conception of 
an intelligent mind or consciousness residing 
somewhere in the brain. The teacher who has 
had the full quota of psychological courses, 
talks as glibly of Iltraining the mind" and in 
the same sene~, as one who has never hea.rd of 
psychology. 110 
The Behaviorist does not refer to true psychology but 
to behavioristic psychology. Popular psychology with its sim-
ple terminology is more correct than the behavioristic, Which 
artificially and arbitrarily has simplified unscientifica.lly to 
too grea.t a simplicity, and is back again 2000 yea.rs to the 
Grecia.n cosmologistic philosophers, who were laying scientific 
foundations and saw the most obvious, nothing but the material 
world. The unscientific Behaviorist studying human behavior 
Bees matter, matter everywhere, but not a sign of sou IJ 
Since the Behaviorist will not admit scientifically 
the existence of the soul but is forced to attend to mind and 
consciousness, our subsequent investlga.tion will be devoted to 
these psychic phenomen~ 
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\ .. 2 • 
• EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
2. HUMAN BEHAVIOR, CONSCIOUSNESS & KIND. 
CONSCIOUSBESS is awareness of the activities of the sel 
Oonsciousness is awareness of the activities of the ensouled or 
ganism. It is cognition and recognition of such processes as 
sens ing, imagining, fee ling, thinking and willing. Has this 
power of awareness, this consciousness, a Struoture? According 
to the Scholastic, it c8.nnotj for it is not organic, not ma.te-
rial. Is it, then, a distinct entity in the strict sense of th 
term, a something existing in its own right? Scholasticism has 
been accused of mu).tiplying use less terms and so obfusoating 
many an issue. Let us first examine, then, What modern psy-
cho logists ho 1d. 
This problem well merits prolonged aneJ1ysis. Is con-
sciousness psychical as held by Structural Psychology, by the 
School of Titchener? arshall we hold that consciousness is a 
something that has no physical properties, and that its psychic-
8.1 properties or attributes are (1) quality, (2) intensity, (3) 
extent, and (4) duration? \fill these attributes s'o fa.r enumera 
ed suffice for a descriptive definition of oonsciousness? 
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In the first place, Professor Stout maintains that 
'oonsciousness itself is not susceptible of a positive defini-
tion. "65 Seoond~, Professor Weiss well interprets our modern 
pSychological perplexities regarding mind and oonsciousness: 
"If I have interpreted Wheeler66 and 
Fernberger67 correctly, they both ho ld to 
a monistio system and that a physical one. 
They recognize, however, that in the ana,-
lysis of human achievement many fs,ctors 
are unknown, and some of these fs,otors 
seem to be sufficient Jy different from the 
biophysics,l and biosocial facts that we do 
know, that the old subjective terminology 
is justified, but the dualism that origin-
ally went with it is not. nbS 
How in the name of Science and ~gio oan the Behavioris 
in one and the same passage reoognize factors that differ es-
lentially from biophysical faotors, reoognize a manifest dualis 
and then immediately deolare that dualism is inadmissible? This 
is a plain oontradiction to preserve monistio and meohanistic 
psychology and Unsciantifio Behaviorism. The conclusion did 
not follow from the premises cited; neither does the following: 
"The Behaviorist concludes that if mental or 
oonscious prooesses are regarded as particular 
types of chemical or physioal processes of as 
yet unknown oomposition, then only one entity 
or one syltem of events need be assumed and 
that it would be Simpler to admit that con-
sOienoe, oonsciousness and mind are merely 
terms that s,re used as substitutes for any 
real knowledge of the events to whioh they 
refer. 1169 . 
And he would be justified and logical in holding this 
conclusion were it not for the fact that mental prooesses are 
not one s stem of events with physical processes or ohemical, 
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but processes of a higher and entirely different order which is 
apparently altogether unknown to the -modern mind." These two 
essentially distinct orders, the physical and the mental, re-
quire a dualistic theory. Any purely fonistic theory, therefor 
is unreasonable and unsCientific, for it contradicts the facts. 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEHAVIORIS~ 
WATSON AND CONSCIOUSNESS. Many a sincere psychologist 
confessed before 1914 that burying the soul did the science of 
psychology no good. yet Watson did not learn from the mistakes 
of previou~ psychologists. Let us follow his development: 
(1) In his first book, "Psycho logy from the Standpoint 
of a Behaviorist," published in 1914, he says:. 
"The psychology begun by Wundt has fa.iled 
to become a science because he onlI substi-
tuted • Consciousness , for 'Soul. '"(0 
(2) At the time of his publication of "Behaviorism, An 
Introduction to Comparative Psychology," he is indifferent to 
Oonsciousness: 
"One can assume either the presence or 
absence of coneciousness ••• without affect-
ing the problems of behavior by one jot or 
one tittle. 1 7l 
(3) But by September, 1927, Watson writes -The Myth of 
the Unconscious" for Harper's Kagaaine, and says behavioristio-
8.l1y: 
"The Behaviorist finds no 'mind' in his 
laboratories, sees it nowhere in his sub-
jects ••• if the behaviorists are right, then •• 
••• there ce,n be no such thing as 
consciousness. -72 
This, then, is an example of the evolution of psychol-
Ogy from the sta,ndpoint of the Beha,viorist Watson. But from 
the sta,ndpoint of any truly scientific psychologist it looks as 
if all trace of psychology had thus fa,r been ca,refully left 
out. What rems.ins? After studying Watsonian Behaviorism, 
Ha,rvey Wickham in his book" "The Kisbehaviorists," tells us: 
"Psychology is the study of the 
conscious self. Doctor Watson says 
not. He thinks that psychology is 
the study of the reaction-mass. "73 
And so Psychology has evolved into a study of PhySics~ 
WEISS AND CONSCIOUSNESS. By 1929, for Behaviorism 
"Consoiousness as a non-physical, 
spontaneous, self-initiating form of 
energy does not exist. 
Consciousness as an implioit form 
of behavior or as an obscure physico-
chemical pr~cess is best described as 
behavior. "7~ 
Wha,t argument or fact does the Behaviorist, Weiss, of-
fer for making consciousness entirely physical? 
"As soon as social organization and 
social achievement had reached a cer-
tain stage the difference between man 
and the animals seemed to be ,more than 
a difference of anatomy and, physiology. "75 
Darwinian evolution is here stated as a fact. Is it a 
fa,ct, or has contemporary Sclence discarded this untenable and 
fanci~ul hypothesis, Prof. 'I'eias himself disbelieves it: 
"Man was said to know, feel, perceive, judge, and even create his universe. 
Oogito, ergo SUIIl, does not seem to be an 
animal reaction or the product of an auto-
maton ••• lt is this gap between animal and 
man which behaviorism is trying to reduce 
to pure 1y mechanical components, s,nd 
against which traditional and6PoPular 
psychology are most active. "7 
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The Behaviorist is trying to make the impossible pos-
sible. We, therefore, conclude: 
1. Behaviorism, according to Watson and 
Meyers and Weiss, will never reduce the gap 
between brute and man, between material and 
spiritual; therefore Behaviori8m is attempt-
ing an impossible task. 
2. For the gap is not one of mere com-
plexity, but a, difference in KIND. Just as 
vital and non-vital can never be identified, 
nei ther can brute and man. Until black be-
comes whi te,and white becomes black under 
precisely the same conditions, then and then 
only, will brute ~come man, and man become 
brute. BUt such a time will never come, for 
contraries will ever rems,in opposed, and 
therefore, two contraries can never both be-
come true at the sa.me time under precisely 
the same condi tions. 
3. Therefore, Behaviorism throws reason 
and logic a,nd science to the winds, and that 
is why this thesis proves and maintains that 
the scientific behaviorist ~ unscientific. 
While we are on the Question of science in psychology, 
it may be instructive to inquire for what scientific reasons 
the Behaviorist ignores the mind and consciousness, and a for-
ttori the substance underlying these functions, the human soul, 
the study of which constitutes, real, honest-,;BC~eD.,tilf1c,'. human, 
behav&Dr~stic study. 
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WHY DOES THE BEHAVIORIST IGNORE MIlD OR OONSOIOUSNESS? 
~y does the behavioristic psychology make an illicit transition 
from the animistic conoeption of human behavior to the mechan-
istic? 
"The behaviorist affirms that his science 
is a study of the material, biological, me-
chanioal, and social antecedents that are at 
the basis of human achievement ••• To speak of 
investigating a non-material, non-biologioal, 
non-mechanioal, non-causal entity has simply 
no scientifio meaning."?? 
It has no scientifio meaning for the Behaviorist perhap 
, 
He it is that is ignorant of an entity that oan put life into 
our meohanical, lifeless psychology. Only a soul can make psy-
chology dynamio! What is it, may we ask, in human beings that 
is dynamio, that is oonsoious? 
"(I) Either the brain thinks, that is, 
material substance is the substrate of 
oonsoious prooesses; . 
(2) Or the noDimaterial thinks, that 
is, the soul thinks; (3) Or neither the mind nor the soul 
thinks, but we have oonscious prooesses 
alone.,,?t5 
In this enumeration Koore has included all the possib-
ilities. Wundt held the view of consoious processes alone, a 
position untenable, beoause we simply cannot conueive of aotion 
without an aotor, aa motion without anything moving, or thought 
without a thinker. 
Given conscious prooesses, we must thereupon conclude 
that these activities are manifestations of some underlying sub-
stance that is responsible for them. Now this substanoe is 
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either the brain or the soul; but the brain is material. We 
ehall now prove scientifically and experimentally with Professo 
Moore that conscious processes a,re not activities of matter, 
that ODnsciousness cannot be essentially brain activity. 
If If identities are to be identical, and. explan-
ations are to explain, we cannot identify our mental 
life with chemical reactions (life with non-life) or 
explain consciousness in terms of energy, which is 
~erely that which moves 'a mass with a given velocity. 
If one takes a mechanical view of life at its face 
value, it is nothing but a series of chemical re-
actions in which mole oules, made of atoms, disinte-
gra,te one by one and ne .. molecules are formed with 
the elimination, or by the aid" of heat. Does this 
view explain how a chemical reaction can be conscious 
of itself, or how one chemical reaction can be con-
soious of another?"77 
A dance of a,toms can never be identified with the sen-
aation of red. 
"The danoing atoms ha~e no identity whatsoever 
with, they do not even bear a resemblance to, a 
sensation. They cannot, therefore, expla,in even a 
sensation, let alone the higher thought processes 
and the !lctivity of the wilL If, therefore, there 
must be some substrate of conscious processes, some-
thing whioh is active when the mind is conscious, 
and if this oannot be a material substance, then 
there must be a non-material substance, that is to 
say, a spiritual substanoe or soul."7g 
It has been said that psychology has lost, first its 
soul, then its mind, and finally its consciousness, and so be-
came mechanistic. Let us not lose our mind but loose our mind, 
let us be open-minded. That is the real scientifio attitude. 
Then we shall be oonscious of the fact that the mechanistic the-
ory of today is driving us straight into the open arms of the 
vitalistio theory of tomorrow! 
THE DUALIST AND CONSCIOUSNESS. Mind, then, and con-
~oiousness must be regarded Bot as a material struoture of the 
lumanbody but as a function of the soul. No other position is 
~ena,ble til experimental psychology as we have demonstrated. Ac-
~ording to this view, there is no consoiousness as a unitary 
!tructure, but oonscious processes, not mind but mental processe 
Lf we speak strictly and scientifically, not sensation but sen-
Bory processes, not pleasantness or unpleasantness, but only 
affective processes, not a will but willing processes or activi-
ties of the soul. Psychologically, all these processes must be 
regarded 8,S functions of one and the same essentially unchanging 
soul. 
THE DUALIST AND I1ID. If mind is not a structure, if 
it is not a substance, and if consciousness is a function of the 
soul, what, then, is mind? It, too, is a funotion of the soul. 
How do mind and oonsciousness d1ffer? M1nd is the tote,li ty of 
oonscious processes, it is the SUli. total of those non-me,ter1al 
foroes controlling our human behavior. Is not mind, then, a 
structure? It is not, for the sum total of conscious processes 
can never equal a strueuu.e. Stout defines mind sim1larly: 
fA m1nd is the unity of me.nif 0 ld 
successive and simultaneous modes of 
consciousness in an individual whole. "79 
In other words, we can say with Titchener that mind is 
the sum tote,l of conscious activities. activities of what? Of 
!n experiencing self, the EGO. This is our next topic. 
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-. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
!3. HOKAN BEHAVIOR AllD THE "EGO." 
Kind has been defined as the sum total of oonsoious ao-
tivities. But aotivities demand an aotor, a unity of past and 
present oonsoious prooesses demand a unifying prinoiple, for 
whioh, as we have proved, there is no room in the behavioristio 
eleotron-proton evolutionary and meohanistio theory. This is 
another stumbling-blook to the Behaviorist. Prof. Weiss writes: 
"Professor Titohener more than any other 
inv~stigator has proposed rigorous defini-
tions for such terms as mind, oonsoiousness, 
mental element, but inevitably some inner 
aspeot, 'an experienoing self,' proves a 
stumbling-blook against the uniformity in 
aooepting or understa,nding the definitions 
that are proposed. "SO 
It is not only a stumbling-blook, it is an insurmount-
able obstacle, it is beyond the understanding of the Eehavioris 
How d.id Titohener, himself a orypto-materialist, dispose of that 
"Experienoing Self1" He annihilated it~ And alliin the name of 
SOienoe, of Psychology} Professor Gruender summarizes well the 
"annihilation of the Ego from Oonsoiousness" in his excellent 
book "Psydhology without a Soul," in the ohapter entitled aptly: 
II 
~_-----------------------------------------------------------f 
THE ANNIHILATION OF THE "EGO" FROM PSYCHOLOGY IS THE 
ANNEHILATION OF TRUTH IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE} The Ego, that 
well-known, directly known abiding entity, must go, must be 
entirely eliminated from psychology~ 
"But psychology, if it is to be a scien-
tific psychology, cannot reoognize this 
truth 70f the Ego/ a. we have heard Prof. 
Titchener state. And he voices only the 
general trend of thought among modern psy-
chologists. The datum of scientific psy-
chology is: Thought processes are gOing 
on in the worl~ Scientific psychology 
demands that menta·l phenomena be expressed 
impersonal~ much as we say, for insta,nce, 
it ra.ins. II 
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But why must the person, why must "I," the Ego, why 
must this datum which is so unavoidable be excluded, and why 
must merely impersonal datum be datum of scientific psychology? 
Why can it not recognize the Ego, the substs.ntial principle of 
thought? Professor Gruender, who studied under Professor Tit-
chener, gives the following reason: 
"The reason, we are told, is because the 
object of scientific psychology is tmind, not 
as popularly understood, but mind accessible 
to experiment.' Prof. Titchener, however, 
forgets that mind is really not accessible to 
experiment except as a substantial prinCiple 
of thought, expressed by the personal pronoun 
tI'. For no men~l fact can be observed even 
superficially, and still less be subjected to 
experiments.1 research, except by means of 
introspection or internal experience.. Every 
act of introspection reveals the substantial 
subject of consoious states, the EGO. 1152 
Is this laSt statement true? If it is, how is it pos-
sible for Titchener, introspeotion's champion, eliminattng all 
persona.li ty from his psychology, to eliminate the Ego? We 
challenge him to remove the ego from common parlance. What 
shall be the result. 
"This /the presence of the Ego in introspection/ 
is so true, that even Prof. Titchener himself in 
his supreme effort to eliminate the Ego from the 
expression of internal experiences in that speo-
imen of scientific language which engaged our at-
tention •• ('Mind splits up into consciousnesses, 
the breakfast-consciousness, the newspaper-and-
correspondence-consciousness, etc. I) was obliged 
to prefix the Ego of antediluvian days in the 
shape of the pluralis majesta.ticus: ITo put the 
matter crudely, It begin the day with a getting-
up consciousness. Ng3 
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And so we must agree with Prof. Gruender who must agree 
with Prof. Titchener, that this is putting the matter crudely, 
in fact, very crude ly, if indeed the personal pronoun must 
needs be excluded from the terminology of scientific psychology. 
If Scientific Behaviorism or scientific psychology de-
nies at the very outset the SUbstantial principle of thought, 
the Ego or the Experiencing Self, that psychology commits a 
suicidal blunder. 
THE "EGO" AND THE DUALIST. Wha,t are the experimental 
facts of personal experience, of being conscious of the Ego in 
action? Can these be verified whenever desired? A comprehensiv 
yet brief description which answers these question has been 
nished to us by the ProfeBsor of Experiments.l Psychology at St. 
Louis University, whose psychology recognizes the existence of 
. the soul: 
"I am able to observe and study my own 
thoughts, I can make the reasoning process 
and my own reasoning Ego, the subject of my 
study. Tte marvellous part of this intro-
spective activity of our mind is the per-
fect identity of the thinking sUbject and 
the object of thought. This power of intro-
spection is one of the main sources of ra-
tional psychology and the conditio-sine-qulr 
non of empirioal psychology ••• "gLt. 
The next psychological fact punctures materialism. 
"Now this mental phenomenon (the fact of 
perfect psychological reflexion) finds no 
ana.logon in the realm of the material world; 
nay more, it is in direct oPPosition to the 
known properties of matter ••• that an atom 
act upon itself is repugne.nt to the known 
nature of matter. Yet every hypothesis, 
making the brain the organ of introspective. 
thought, meets precisely with the difficulty just mentioned."S5 
What, then, does psychology with a soul and with an 
Ego maintain scientifically by experimentation by means of 
introspection? 
"Through psychological reflexion we 
never perceive the Ego except in some 
act of cognition or volition, sensitive 
or rational ••• A thought or volition with-
out 'a SUbject is never met with in our 
experience; we always perceive the thought 
and volition in the concrete, i~e., the 
Ego thinking, the Ego willing. "06 
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A study of human behavior, therefore, convinces us that 
we always catch the Ego in actio~ Destroy the Ego and there 
is no human activity. The Ego with its power of Introspection 
will ever remain the pi1lar, the sine-Qua-non condition of 
Experimental, or more strictly spee.king of Empirical Psychology 
OHAPTER V. 
"SOIENTIFIO BEHAVIORISM" IS UNSOIENTIFIO. 
1. UNSOIENTIFIO BEHAVIORISTIO POSTULATES. Is the galax 
of postulates of the Soientifio Beha.viorist soientifio? Here i 
nebtibus a,rray of nebulous Behavioristic "postulates:" 
"(1) I assume that a reformation of the 
psychological postulates is jU8tified, 
if it/Behaviori8m/ establishe8 a method-
o logy which rep laces the mind- body dua 1-
i8m by a systematic monism ba8ed on the 
aS8umptions of the physica.l sciences. ·g7 
This thesis has proved the impo8sibility of the replace 
ment of the mind-body dualism by systematic materialistic and 
mechanistic Monism. The Behaviorist Weiss "postulates It that 
"( 2) the postula,tes are a8sumed to be 
forms of motion. "gg 
Materialistic monism has never justified this ancient 
assumptio~ The Scholastic philosopher might ask: "How can an 
immaterial being move from place to place if it is not in a 
place?" But this question wodld be ~yond the comprehension of 
Ma.teria.listic Beha.viorism. 
"(3) The universe is the sum of the move-
ments of its funda,mental elements, the 
electrons and protons."g9 
This thesiS haa demonstrated the existence of no~ 
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material entities in the world, and consequently the Behavior-
istic world-view of the universe is inadequate. 
"Ol) The totality of these evolving dyna.mic 
electron-proton systems: /evolving from/ 
free electrons and. protons, 
atomic types of organization, 
mo lecular types, 
inorganic crystalline types, 
organic protoplasmic types, 
Unicellar types of organization, 
Multicellular or organismic types; 
these in turn evolve into the 
Compound fUlticellular or social types of 
organi1.ation ••• 
The tota.li ty of these dynamic elec troIl-
proton interactions forms the movement 
continuum, or the Cosmos. "90 
This thesis has 411~i'''.4 the assumptions of such a 
Materialistic and Darwinian Evolution. The basic assumption 
of such an Evolution is that the Oosmos originated and evolved 
entirely and only by Chance. If the Scientific Behaviorist wil 
prove to us tha.t by casting alphabetical block he can !2I.chance 
compose a Shakespearean drama, then we shall believe him when h 
a.Bsumes and "postulates" that this Universe, this orderly Cosmo 
evolved by chance~ 
-"SCIEHTIFIC BEHAVIORISMII IS UNSOIENTIFIC. 
2. Unscientific BEHAVIORISTIO COROLLARY. 
It is evident that Science is not Mathematics , neither 
does Psychology with its study 'of vital behavior and human ac-
tions and reactions become identica.l with Mathematics. But the 
Scientific Behaviorist evolves an unscientific corollary from 
his unscientific assumption of electron-proton evolution. 
II Tradi tiona I psycho logy regards man as 
being controlled by a sort of spirit man 
within the physical man and that the mea-
. surement of human achievement is the mea-
suring of so-cs.lled processes as s.ttention, 
perception, wishes, volitions, images, etc. 
The behaviorist regards man as a link 
in the cha,in of physical processes which 
make up the universe and with this assump-
tion goes the corollary that the measur~ 
ments of human behavior and of human a-
chievement are of the s~me order as 
physical measurements."~l 
It is a fact that to some modern scientists Science is 
Identified with MathematiCS. We repeat: Science and Mathematici 
are not synonymous~ 
This is a fundamentally erroneous corollary evolved 
from the hppothesis, whioh today is untenable, that man is a 
machine, nothing more nor less than a complex automaton made up 
----------------------------------------------------------------, 
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of nothing but billions of e1eotrons and protons arranged by 
chanoe and maintained by ohanoe in most marvellous oonfigur8-
tions as yet unfathomed by Physioal Soienoe. 
In this thesis we have demonstrated that Empirioal 
psychology oan never be identified with Physios or Mathematics, 
for human behavior does not without exception always fall into 
the category of Matter. It should be evident to Behavioristic 
psycho logists that Psychology needs a different measuring-stick 
for such processes as thinking and willing than a yard-stick or 
micrometer rule. lor Psyoho1ogy there is none other, espe-
cially in the realm of Introspection or Ref1exion, that is or 
ever will be available while human nature and human behavior 
remain what they are, than the Oonsoious Ego, than this dis-
carded Experiencing Ego, without which even the yard-stick or 
the micrometer rule would be useless. 
"SCIENTIFIC BEHAVIORISM" IS UNSCIENTIFIC. 
, 
3. UNSCIENTIFIC BEHAVIORISTIC ETHICS. 
The Behavioristio Psychologist beoomes and evolves into 
in Ethioal Philosopher. Here is the treatment on the Ethios of 
luman behavior whioh does no oredit to Scientifio Behaviorism. 
iere is the evidenoe, q~oted from Weiss' Behavioristic Theory: 
"If the assumption that a rigid. mechanism may 
underlie huma.n behavior and human aohievement 
has a probability suffioiently high to receive 
scientifio recognition, then in the formulation 
of the future program of sooial oontrol there 
will be a reaction against some of the norms 
whioh have been develo:Qed under a traditional and 
nonscientifio ethios."~2 
This is not soientifio, this is ridiculous} There is 
lot the probability of one ohanoe in a trillion that this Cosmos 
las evolved aocording to rigid meohanistio and Darwinistic "pos-
tula.tes." But the Behaviorist is undaunted, he is brave, he 
thinks that his theory may some day attain "a probability suf-
riciently high to reoeive soientific recognition." Muoh l! ss 
Ghis being Scienoe, it is not even gambling, for the Behaviorist 
laS not even a gambler's chanoe for his dreams to come true. 
Sinoe meohanistio behaviorism is non-soientific be-
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it is erroneous to maintain that man has evo lved from "primeval 
007.e ll and nothing more, such erroneous and unscientific psy-
chology is not entitled to generate and evolve scientific be-
R.vioristic ethics. Scientific ethics must ever be based upon 
a true knowledge of human nature. It is a historictllly t1nde-
niable fact that human nature is essentially fixed, and so it 
follows that morality a.nd human ethics in their fundamental 
principJe s are fixed essentially and eternally. But the :Be-
haviorist, Weiss, believes in ethical evolution also. 
"Extending the time limi tsbackward to 
the beginning of the species homo sapiens, 
anthropologists would probably predict in-
creasing variability. This seems to speak 
against the stable equilibrium principle 
and against the probability of an unchang-
ing norm for human behavior. ,,93 
No need to remark more than that some of our modern 
Anthropologists, as prophets of Darwinian Evolution, have turn 
out to be· Fa,]se Prophets. But the Behaviorist unscientifically 
believes them. He ba.ses his entire science of Behaviorism upon 
their predictions, upon the "Variability" of their shifting 
sands: 
If Of the four types of theories presented, 
the VARIABIIlTY theory ••• based upon life 
from non-life ••• seems to conform best with 
the facts found in the evolution of human 
behavior ••• "" 
We must interrupt such nonsense.' Darwin and Huxley a.nd 
Speneer and Stanley Hall have introduced nothing but erroneous 
found!ttions when they propounded the theory of Uni linear 
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Evolution, life from non-life •. The work~ of Kiroher, Loeuwen-
hoek, Sohwan, Spallanzani, Pasteur and Tpndall have given the 
dea th- blow to that false hypothesis: "All lI1fe from non-life." 
The only soientifio faot that we know regarding Evolution, whio 
is inoontrovertible, is: "All life from life." Interpreted 
negatively, this means: "No life from non-life." 
But Professor Weiss logioally oonoludes: 
"The variability theory seems to oonform 
best with the faots found in the evolution 
of human behavior, and the behaviorist.'s 
problem thus beoomes that of showing that 
this varia.bili ty may be a meohanioal funo-
tion of biophysioal and biosooial oauses. "95 
The unsoientifio aspeot ani the 'immoral' probabilities 
of the Behavioristio quest, engender a soruple in the mind of 
the Behaviorist: 
If If norma,li ty is measured by th~ degree 
of stability of the speoies, the terms fOOd 
and bad mean something different than i 
normi'l'rty between internal and external 
relations is based upon the extension of 
geographio range, or on an inorease of po-
pulation. There are strong objeotions 
against introducing ethioal implioations 
into animal behavior but in the faoe of 
the fruitfulness of the phylogenetio method 
in the study of human behavior, this objeo-
tion is likely to vanish. 1196 
We leave the Behaviorist with his soruple. Whatever 
the Behaviorist 'may be, psychologist, philosopher, ethician, one 
thing is sure---and it i8 precisely this that our thesis aimed 
to prove---THE "SOIENTIFIO BEHAVIORIST" IS NOT SOIENTIFIO. 
"SOIENTIFIC BEHAVIORISM" IS UNSOIENTIFIC. 
4. UNSOIENTIFIC BEHAVIORIS~IC BIAS. 
After lauding natural soienoe, Prof. Weiss says: 
"From sooia1 soienoe we have seoured better 
organization, better training, but we have 
scaroely started on the pa.th of an equitable 
distribution among individuals of the bene-
fits of scienoe. For too many of us more 
machinery means less leisure. The benefits 
of science are wasted upon a few at the 
expense of the many. "97 
This knowledge is oommon property. But 
"The benefits of soience are wasted upon 
a few at the expense of the many. This is 
a vestige of the type of ethics in whioh 
every individual was rega.rded as the ser-
vant of some superhuman being or foroe by 
whom or by whioh his social status was de-
termined at the time of his birth."9g 
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Professor Weiss is not speaking here as a Scientist 
and Psychologist but as an EthicianJ He is planning a program 
out of his own specialty; he is plainly beyond his ken. He 
seems to have confused Nietzsohe's Superman with the All-Perfe 
BeingJ His thesis is untenable in the light of the historical 
researoh of our own day. His attitude has been oharacterized 
as a "conspiracy against the truth." It is a "spotted" heri-
tage of the Protestant Revolution. It is an unscientific a.t-
titude of a materialistic and mechanistio "soience." 
OHAP TJ:R VI. 
SUMMARY and OONCLUSION. 
I. A problem and conflict arise when the Behaviorist 
explicitly condemns all other psychologists as unscientific, 
and declares himself to be the only scientist and psychologist 
who studies human behavior scientifically~ This claim is chal-
lenged and investigated in this thesis: "Is the 'Scientific' 
Behaviorist Scientific?" The two conflicting theories regardinl~ 
the basis of human behavior are presented and ana1yze4: (1) the 
position of the Behaviorist, who is a materialistic and mechan-
istic Monist, and (2) the position of the Dualistic Vitalist. 
II. These positions eVidently are fundamentally con-
tradictory; therefore, one must be false. We disoover that in 
defining his ultimate basic position and fundamental principle 
the Behaviorist makes the fatal error of confusing a postulate, 
which is a proved fact, and an assumption, which is an unproved 
hypothesia. 
III. The opposition between the Monistic tehaviorist 
and the Dualistic Vi tal1st i8 essentially and fundamentallJ a 
conflict between Hylomorphic Dualism and rigorously determin-
istiC, evolutionary mechanistiC, and "scientifically" Darwin-
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iatic, electro-protonistic, ontogenetically and phylogeneticall 
reca.pi tularistic, unequivocally Behavioristic Monism. 
to the Behaviorist, human behavior is merely the energy of phy 
ical motion which can be calculated and determined and predicte 
with metaphysical and absolute mathematical precision. This 
position manifestly contradicts every-day experience regarding 
the freedom of individual human behavior. The Vitalist, there-
fore, relying upon direct experience and soientifically Je giti-
mate empirical data, does soientifioally maintain that a part 0 
human behavior is undenia"bly free and is physically and morally 
undetermined before the aot is posited. He is supported in his 
view by Common Sense furnishing to his Thesis the Universal Co 
sent of Mankin,. He, the Dualistio Vitalist, is the ohampion 0 
this Popular Psyohology, which is refined but unchanged essen-
tially by Empirical, E.xperime~tal, or Rational Psyohology. 
Reviewing the History of Psyohology with its material-
istic errors, from the time of Plato and Aristotle through St. 
Thomas Aquinas and Meroier to this our day to whom human beha-
vior and So ientific Psyoho logy was an absorbing problem, we can 
see clearly tha,t, in order to avoid erros and really explain hu 
man behavior, we are forced to aooept the hylomorphio theory of 
matter and soul, of these two prinoiples, one of whioh is mate-
rial and inaotive, and the other is spiritual and dynamio. This 
theory does not admit that deadly epigram: "All life from non-
lifeJ" which the Behaviorist acoept unquestioningly, but Which 
r 
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IV. Next, the scientific, psychological views of the 
Behaviorist and Vitalist are contrasted and investigated as to 
their scientifio validity and degree of cogency when the fol-
lowing problems are analyzed: 
1. The sUbject-matter of General Psyohology. 
2. The subject-matter of Empirice,l Psychology. 
This Speoial Psychology, experimenting with a human being and 
his behavior, demands a study of: 
1. Human behavior e,nd the vi tal principle, or Soul. 
2. Human behavior and Oonsciousness or Min~ 
3. Humen behavior and the Experienoing Subject,Ego. 
This scientific investigation reveals the fact that the Behaviol~ 
ist does not do what he promised and set out to do, namely,to 
explain the phenomena of human baha,vior; he $i ther denies these 
phenomena or deliberately ignores them. 
V. This concluding chapter reviews facts and arguments 
previously offered. Its conolusions prove beyond the least 
possibility of doubt that the "Scientific" Behaviorist is 
ama!ingly unscientifio in his study of human behavior, with his 
1. Unscientific postulate, which is an assumption 
believing mechanistio and darwinistio evolution as true; 
2. Unscientific corolla,ry, believing all of huma.n 
behavior to be physical motion and mathematically sure; 
3. Unscientific morality, of the laissez-faire, 
individualistic, godless type, theoretioally discarded; 
4. Unscientific ~rejudioe, denying ~d and deifyins 
Man. The Behaviorist should know that only a fool says 
in his heart: "There is no God.''' 
APPENDI OES. 
PROLOGtJJ:. 
Oatholic Psychology is Scientific Psychology because 
it is true and universal. Other psychologies, as, for example, 
Behaviorism, are only partially true, because they only discern 
the human in man and are blind to the divine in him. In the 
following appendices, it is my intention to discuas human beha-
vior in so far as it is an imitation or participation of Divine 
behavior, for human life is essentially an imitation or partic-
ipation of Divine LifeJ The BehaTiori8t denies God and recog-
nizes only mechanical energy to be a fact in human behavior; 
the Vitalist knows that man has life, but that God is Life, 
and he knows that energy eXists, but that God is the EnergistJ 
Since the phenomenon "Motion" is characteristic of 
a.ll life, and since the Behaviorist has confused vi tal motion 
with physical motion until he has identified material and psy-
chic motiona, we propose, with God's help, to discuss: 
L Human behavior is vital action, is vital motion. 
2. Does motion prove the existence of God? 
3. Whence co_S vital motion? 
APPENDIX I. 
WHETHER HOllAN BEHAVIOR IS PROPERLY VITAL :MOTIO!? 
Vital motion demands life. What is life? To answer, 
we musk ask first: "What beings have life?" Considering the 
characteristics of living beings in the world around us, it is 
clear to us that those beings are properly called living that 
move themselves by some kind of motion, whether this motion is 
properly so called or motion in a more general sense, 8.S when 
predicated of the act or "energeia" of a perfect thing, as 
"understanding" and "feeling" are calle d motion. Accordingly, 
all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to 
motion or operation of any kin~ 
And what is life? To live is nothing else than to 
exist in this or that nature, and life signifies this living 
or existing, though in the abstract. 
Hence, to say that a thing is alive is to predicate of 
it something substantial and not merely accidental. Sometimes, 
however, life is used less properly for the operations ffom 
which its name is taken. In all events, life implies some kin 
of se If-movement. 
Has man life? Bot only haa man life, but he has it in 
the highest degree of all .isible creation. To prove that thi 
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is true, let thet:ehavior of living things be produced as true 
experimental evidence. In this discussion, living motion will 
be emphasized. It must be noted that "motion" here is used in 
a techaical sense, namely, the passage or transit from one 
state or stage to another state. Thus, it may be said that 
different phs.ses of living behavior, d.ifferent living phases 
of actiTity are different living motions. It may further be 
sa.id, that the more perfect is vi tal behavior, the more per-
fect is this vital or psychic motion. 
In the lowest order of living things, at the very bot-
tom of the scaDa of psychic activity and vital movement are 
the plants, beings which have characteristically immanent ac-
tion of bodies endowed with a psychic or vital principle, but 
which do not feel or understand or wilL By immanent action 
is meaat that plants operate from within, that is, that they 
move themselves, when this term is used in our technical senae, 
namely, the passage from one state to another. Casual observ-
ation of plant behavior is sufficient to convince anyone that 
these beings possess the characteristics of living things, suo 
move.ents as nutrition, growth, reproduction, regeneration, 
decay a,nd many other anabolic and katabolic processes. 
But plants possess only one of the three specific mov 
ments of living things. Specifically, these three movements 
are vegetation, sensation, intellection. That plants lack 
powers of cognition must be conceded until experimental or 
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objeotive evidenoe prove the oontrary. 
In a higher order must be olassified the vital move-
ments of animals. Ordinarily,- an animal is said to live when 
it moves itself; and as long as suoh motion appears in it, it 
is oonsidered to be alive. By its own natural powers, an animal 
moves itself from plaoe to plaoe. Its aotivity, therefore, is 
also immanent, a. oharaoteristic of living beings alone. Suoh 
operations e,re called immanent and manifest vita.l aotivity whose 
prinoiples are within the operator. In virtue of its vital 
prinoiple the animal produoes a oharaoteristio, animal operation 
of whioh the plant is inoapable, namely, movement from plaoe to 
p laoe or locomot ion. 
But animals possess a still higher type of vital mo-
tion; they manifest sense cognition. Their end organs for co~ 
nizing sensible objects are analogous to human organs. To deny 
sense oogni tion to anima.ls as a property endowed them by nature 
is to render their looomotion purposeless. 
It has litewise been observed that the more perfect 
the sensorium of animals, the more perfeot is their power of 
self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touoh move so 
slowly as to be almost indistinguishable from plants; whereas 
such as have true sense power besides touoh, not merely oognise 
objeots in oontaot with thea, but objeots apart from themselves. 
As these animals can oognize objeots at a distanoe, they are 
found to possess locomotive powers in proportion so that they 
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call move themselves to considerable distances by progressive 
contractions and relaxations. 
A more perfect degree of live and psychic motion is 
found in intelligent beings. That which progresses by a rea,-
soning process from a principle to a conclusion, or from con-
crete and specific instances to a general law, can be said to 
possess a higher species of psychic motion. If, further, in 
such beings, understanding is considered as a species of psy-
chic motion, of a psychic transit from one state to another, 
that which understands undubi tably itself 1s llIery properly 
said to move itself. Such movement is characteristically hu-
man movement; therefore, human behavior is properly vital 
motion. 
APPENDIX II. 
DOES KOTION PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF GOD? 
There are two kinds of movements or actions or motions, 
transient and immanent. In transient action a being effects a 
transference of energy from itself to another, energy goes out 
of it to a.nother and so effects a cha.nge in some external mat-
ter, as in heating or cutting; in immanent motion, the action 
rema,ins in the agent, as in acts of understanding, willing, or 
feeling. Tra,nsient a.ction is a perfection of the thing moved, 
not of the mover. Immanent action is a perfection of the agent. 
Immanent action is called movement because of its similarity to 
transient action. Tra.nsient movement, the only one the Behavi-
orist sees and properly cognizes, i8 something imperfect, some-
thing which exists potentiallY. Immanent movement is a perfec-
tion and is not potential, but actual. Motion in this second 
sense belongs most properly to God, Je ss properly to man. God 
moves Himself, and man imitates God in this behavior, inasmuch 
as that which understands itself is said to move itself. And so 
motion, that is IlIIIIlanent Movement be longs most properly to God, 
and is less perfect in man. 
The argument for the existence of God can be proposed 
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according to the "duns.mis" and flenergeia" theory of Aristotle, 
or potency and act of St. Thomas. let the Behaviorist here not 
that Aristot Ie's "energeia" is toto coelo different from the 
-
mechanistio, physics.1 and material energy of Modern Soienoe. 
We enunciate the principle: "Whatever is moved, is 
moved by something else" (quid.luid movetur, ab a1io movetur.) 
This prinCiple mea,ns that nothing moves itself when used in 
the widest sense, or that whatever moves from one term to any 
other term is moved by another thing. It strictly means (a.nd 
so is here aocepted) that whatever passes from "dunamis" to 
"energeia", i.e., from potency or potentiality to aot, must be 
aotuated by something else. 
As regards living beings in this life we admit that 
they have movement of the.se 1ves, but only part ia 11y and im-
perfectly. In some way or other they require something else, 
at 1e ast to initiate the movement, even though it be self-move 
mente Moreover, in so far as they come into being and thus 
pa.S8 ex potentia in actum, they require something distinct 
from themselves, according to the above principle. 
It is God, the Universal Mover (Plato) Who gives mo-
tion to all beings. He alone does not move in the sense of 
passing from potency to act, He is therefore the Motor Immobili 
(Aristotle); but Be does move most Perfectly in the sense that 
He understands and wills most perfectly. Therefore, God is at 
once the Prime and Ultimate MOTer of all being, Himself being 
unmoved, 8.nd Perfection Hillse1f moving Himself alone.' 
APPENDIX III. 
WHENCE OOKES VITAL MOTION? 
The Behavlorlst is seeklng the anawr to human behavlor 
and to all vltal motlons ln matter, "In mu~'n Wl1~he find ltl 
If ouw prevlous proofs are true, and they are, the beglnnlng 
and end of llfe, the Alpha and Omega of Llfe and of human be-
havior ls God, the MOtor Immobllls} For God ls llfe and Life i. 
God. Behavior and Motion in the most perfeot sense, wl th no 
admlxture of matter or any other imperfeotlon 1s found in God 
alone. If the Behavlorist wishes to study pure and unadulterat 
ed motion, here is his opportunity - let him study Perfeot Mo-
tion, let him study the Perfeot Mover, God HimselfJ The Llfe of 
All Living.' 
"Seek llfe wherever one wlll, lt wlll be found ln no 
one but God. Draw f the bolt of Nature's seorecies t; study the 
'swlft lmportings on the wllful faoe of skies. t Life ls not 
there. 
"Rejolce ln the evening, when she lights 'her gllmmer-
ing tapers round the day'. dead sanotlties. I Life ls not there. 
"Laugh 'in the morning's eyes~' Triumph and sadden 
'with all weather'; weep wlth ~aven and make its 'sweet tears' 
'sa,l t' with your own. Life is not there. 
"Lay your heart to beat agalnst 'the red throb of' the 
'sunset-hea,rt ••• and share oommingllng heat.' Life is not there. 
"Delay the quest for life until 'mangled youth lies 
dead beneath the heap' of years and days 'have orackled and 
gone up in smoke.' Life is not there. 
"Go out beyond thls 'mlst of tears' and 'running 
laughter,' travel 'across the margent of the world,' trouble 
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the 'gold gateways of the stars,' smite 'for shelter on their 
clang~d bars, t ••• 'rise from this valley of death,' repose not, 
rest not in this imperfect communion of created life with cre-
ated life; be satisfied only where 'hid battlements of eternity 
are reached, where there is life which is the Infinite Communio 
'of the Infinite with Itself, the Original Life of all Beings, 
the Eternal Life whence has emanated all thatlives---God",the 
LIFE OF ALL LIVING. the Life of all living. By it the angels 
are immortal; but It our souls have an imperishable existence; 
by It the animals move and grow; by It the plants have their 
being. 
"If It should disappear all earthly life would fall in-
to nothingness for all life on this globe is borrowed. Life is 
not a push from below but a gift from above; human life is not 
a perfection of a,nimal life; it is an imperfect representation 
of Divine Life. There is no spontaneous generation in this 
world, either naturally or supernaturally. Life must come from 
Life. 
"When we return to It we li#e, when we depart from It 
we die---and that Life---the Divine Life---the only Life, the 
Life which all seek, many without knowing it, is the LIfE OF 
GOD, the Life wherein all life rests; the father, Son and Holy 
Ghost to Whom be all honor and glory forever." 
(Ref. - THE LIFE OF ALL LIVING - Rev. Fulton J. Sheen, pp.35-g 
L. D. S. 
•• 
REFERENOES 
1. WeiSS, p. 1. 
2. Whetham, Science, Encycl. Brit. 
3. Watsonf p. 1-
4. James, Vol. I, 'p. IS3. 
5. Gruender, p. 1. 
6. Watson, Preface. 
1. WeiSS, p. vi. 
S. WeiSS, p. ix. 
9. WeiSS, p. vii. 
10. James, Vol. I, p. 1-
11. James, Vol. I, p. IS5. 
12. WeiSS, p. ix. 
13. Spa.lding, pp. 20-21. 
14. WeiSS, pp. 451-452. 
15. Sheen, Essal, 
16. WINdle, p. 226. 
11. Keith, o ONCLUSIONS! 
1!. Amer. Assoc. for Adv. of Science, 1923-1924. 
19. Bra.nco, Lecture, 1901. 
20. Reinke, Part I, p. 13. 
21. Kroeber, ch. I & II. 
22. Kroeber, p. 11. 
23. Darwin, Vo 1. I, p. 2g2. 
SIt' 
24. 0' Toole, p. 353. 
25. O'Toole, p. 353. 
26. Weiss, Intr. 
27. Weiss, pp. vii, viii. 
2g. Weiss, p. 143. 
29. Weiss, pp. 147-14g• 
30. Weiss, p. 14g. 
31• Weiss, p. 14g. 
32• Weiss, p. 7. 
33. Weiss, p. g. 
34• Weiss, pp. 3g..39. 
35. Weiss, pp. 67-6g. 
36. ROBS, pp. 199..lg9. 
37. Weiss, pp. 4s..49. 
3g. WeiBs, p. 49. 
39. WeiBS, p. 49. 
40. Perry, p. 116. 
41. Barnes, p. xiv. 
42. Ryan, p. 356. 
43. WeiBS, p. 52. 
44. Weiss, p. 53. 
45. Weiss, p. 54. 
46. Wetss, p. 54. 
47. WeiBS, p. 55-
4g. .Aristotle, ch •.. i & ii • 
4q. BnearmA.n. ll. 1lS. 
50. )fc Dougal 1, p. 161. 
51. Woodworth, p. 14. 
52. Woodworth, p. 3. 
53. KdDougal1, p. 23. 
54. Aristotle, b.lI, c. 2 - 4l3b. 
55- St. Thomas, ~ Anima .• 
56. Jjlstotle, c. 2. 
57. Aristotle, c. 1-
5g. Dr1esch, p. 327. 
59. Aristotle, c. 2. 413l>-414a. 
60. McDougall, 370. 
61. Weise, p. 302. 
62. Gruender, pp. 201-202. 
63. Weies, pP. 267-26g. 
64. Weiss, p. 26g. 
65. Stout, Vol. I, p. 1-
66. Whee 1er, 1929, pP. 425-446; 1930, 
67. Fernberger, 1929, pp. 409-413. 
6g. Weiss, p. 254. 
69. Weiss, P. 254. 
70. Watson, ch. 1. 
71. Watson, ch. i. 
72. Watson, Harper'a, sept. 1927. 
73. Wickham, pp. 22-23. 
·c 
74• Weiss, p. 273. 
75. Weise, 1'. 275. 
pp. 10}-ll5. 
76. Welss, p. 275. 
77. Welss, pp. 279-2ao. 
7S. Koore, p. 410. 
79. Stout, Vol. I, p. 1. 
SO. WeiSs, PP. 264-265. 
Sl. Gruender, p. 62. 
S2. Gruender, pp. 62-63T64. 
S3. T1 tchener, passim. 
S4. Gruender, p. lit. 
S5. Gruender, pp. 1!!-190. 
S6. Gruender, pp. 199-200. 
S7. Weiss, p. 427. 
Sg. Weiss, p. 427. 
·89. Weiss, p. 427. 
90. Weiss, Postulates, 427f f. 
91. We1s8, pp. 433-434• 
92. We18s, p. 439. 
93. Weiss, pp. 446-447. 
94. WeiSS, p. 447. 
95. Welss, p. 447. 
96. WelS8, p. 445. 
97. WeiSS, p. 447. 
9g. WeiSS, p. 447. 
.-------------------------------------------
Aristotle, 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
:Metaphysios, b. iv, c. 12; b. viii. 
lUchomaohean Ethios, l094b. 
On the loul, b. ii, 00. 1-2. 
History and Prospeot 2L !h!. Sooial !oienoes. 
OF. Zybura. ed. 
Darwin, Oha.rles, '!'he Life and II!tters 2! Charles Darlin. 
I"<r. bYJ'rancis. Iiirwin, lSg7. ~
Driesoh, Hans, The Scienoe !!!S. Philosophy of ~ Q!ganism, 
A. &: O. B1ao k. London. 1929. 
Gruender, Hubert Experimental Psyohology, 
The Bruoe Pub 1. 00. :Mi lwaukee. 1932. 
Psyohology Without ~ Soul. 
B. Herder &: Co. St. Loui s. 1922. 
Fernberger, S. W. Behavior Versus Introspeotive Psyohology. 
Psyoho 1. Rev., 1930. 103-115. 
James, William 
Keith, Sir A., 
!{roeber, A. L., 
Maher, Jl, 
MoDougall, '1m. , 
Moore, De T. V. , 
Prinoiples 2L Psyohology. Vol. I & II. 
Henry Holt &: 00. New York. 1990. 
Anoient Types of Man. 
Harper i s. 1911. 
Anthropo logy. 
Hartoourt, Braoe &: 00. N. Y. 1923. 
Psyohology. Stonyhurst Phil. Seriel. 
LOngma,ns, London. 1930. 
Physiologioal Psyohology. 1905. 
rdY and Mind. aODlinan~ N. Y. 1929. 
Modern Materialism ~ Emergent ~~tion, 
Van Nostrand 00. 1929. 
DInamio Psyoho logy, 
J. B. Lippinoott 00. Philadelphia. 1924. 
o I Too Ie, Geo. B. !I!!...2I!!. against Evo lut ion. 
)laomi1lan 00. 1ge5 
perry, Ralph B., ~esent Philosophioal Tendencies. 
ngmaD.s. London, 1925. 
" Der 'l'Urmer. Part I, v. 
n8L Octo ber, 1902. 
Reinke, P., 
Ross, W. D., Aristotle. 
Methuen & Co. London. 1930. 
Ryan, Jas. H. "Present o;y Thinkers ~ ~ ~ Scholasticism. " 
Zybura. (ed. B. Herder Co. St. Louis, Mo. 1927. 
Schuyler, A., Empirlca,l ~ Sa.tiona.l Psychology, Vol. I. 
Van Antwerp, Bragg & Co. 1882. 
Sheen, Fulton Old Errors and New Labels. 
"The Soul arurt~Twitchings of Behaviorism. It 
Century Co. N.Y. March, 1931. 
Spalding, H. S. Introduction !2. Social Service. 
Heath & Co. Boston. 
Spearman, C., The Abi Ii ties of Mag. 
~millan Co. :re~ork. 1927. 
Stout, E. G., Analytic Psychology. 
Macmillan Co. New York. 1909. Vo 1. I & II. 
Santayana, G. SceRticism and Anima 1 Faith.' 
Char les So ri bner 's Sons. 1923. 
Thomas, St. De Anima. Commentary on Aristotle's "The Soul. If 
Titchener,E.B.! Beginner's Psychology. 
Macmillan Co. New York. 1917. 
Warren, H. G., Elements of Human Psychology, 
Houghton Mifflin Co. New York. 1922. 
Washburn, Y. F. ru. Animal Mind. Animal Behavior Series. 
Macmillan Co. lew York. 1926. 
Watson, I. B, Behaviorism, An Introduction to Comparative Psych. 
1914. 
The Behaviorist Looks at Instincts. 
H'SiPer's. July, 1927.-
Introduction !2. Compa.rative Psychology. 
New York. 1914: 
The lfvth of the Unconscious. 
Harp8rTi Magaz1ne. Sept., 1927. 
Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, 
1914. 
., 
Weiss, Alb. P., ! Theoretical Basis 2t Human Behavior. 
R.I. Adams & Co. Columbus, O. 1929. 
Wheeler, R. He, AnalYzed versus UnanalYzed Experience, 
Psychological Review, 1922. 29: pp. 
Introspection and Behavior. 
425-446, 
Psych. Rev" 1923. 30: pp. 103-115, 
Wbe tham, W, C. D. Sc ience. 
Encyci Sri t. 11 ed. 1911. 
Wickham Harvey The Kisbehaviorists. 
tIncoln )lac Veagh - Dial Press. N. Y. 1925. 
Wilson, ~ ~ 1:a. Development !!!!! Inheritance, 
Macmillan. N. Y. Ed. ii. 1900. 
Windle, Sir B. C. ~ Church and Science. 
Catholic Truth Soc, London. 1917. 
B. Herder Co. St. Louis, 110. 1926. 
Woodworth, R. S. ,psychology, 
Henry Holt & Co. New York. 1934, 
Contemporary Psychologies, 
p. 226. 
P. 2gl. 
Zybura, John S.,Present-dAr Thinkers ~ ~ New Scholasticism. 
B. Herder Co, St. Louis, 19~ 
The thesis nls the Scientific Vehaviorist 
Scientific?", written by Methodius F. Cikrit, S.J., 
has been accepted by the Graduate School of Loyola 
University, with reference to form, and by the 
readers whose n8llles appear below, with reference to 
content. It is, therefore, accepted inpartia~ 
fulfi lment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master ot Arts. 
Rev. Paul V. Kennedy, S.J. 
Rev. Allan p. Farrell,S.J. 
Rev. Oscar J. La Plante, S.J. 
